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INTRODUGTION
A difficult challenge facing the American judicial system is provid-
ing for the fair and efficient resolution of litigation arising from mass
tort liability. A mass tort involves a harmful act or series of acts by a
company, such as the production of a defective product, that results in
injuries to numerous victims-sometimes numbering into the thou-
sands or hundreds of thousands. The most difficult cases are those
involving "long-tail" mass torts, such as those relating to asbestos,
where there is a long latency period between a person's use or expo-
sure to a harmful product and the first manifestation of harm. Re-
moval of the defective product from the marketplace or from society
as a whole will not end the continuing manifestation of injuries.
Given the thousands of future claimants who will first discover their
injuries in decades to come, long-tail mass torts place an enormous
burden on the defendant company and the judiciary. The high costs
of litigation threaten both adequate compensation for the vast num-
ber of victims and the survival of the defendant's business.
The practical inability to provide each tort victim with traditional,
individualized adjudication under the usual rules of litigation in these
mass tort situations has led to the use of class actions or other mecha-
nisms designed to deal collectively, rather than individually, with nu-
merous claimants. When a defendant company is faced with mass tort
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liability that threatens the viability of the enterprise, and other
mechanisms either have failed or would be ineffective in avoiding the
destruction of its business, it is likely to seek protection under the fed-
eral bankruptcy laws. Johns-Manville Corp.,' Celotex Corp.,2 Eagle-
54Picher Industries, Inc., Keene Corp.,4 and at least a dozen other as-
bestos manufacturers deluged with thousands of personal injury
claims; A.H. Robins Co. facing potentially devastating Dalkon Shield
personal injury claims;5 Dow Coming Corp. under an onslaught of
breast implant litigation;s and other companies-all expecting count-
less future claimants who have not yet manifested any injury-have
sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code within
the past twenty years.
When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, Congress did
not contemplate the unique problems caused by mass tort liability in-
volving future, as well as present, claimants, or that companies facing
such massive liability would seek relief under the bankruptcy laws.
The Bankruptcy Code's lack of specific guidance on the treatment
and dischargeability of future claims has resulted in doubts regarding
the powers of a bankruptcy court to deal with mass torts. Moreover,
inconsistent judicial decisions have created confusion and lack of uni-
formity in this area. Commentators7 and professional organizations,
' See In reJohns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 744 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dealing
with motion "to appoint a legal representative for asbestos-exposed future claimants in
the Manville reorganization case" and holding that those future claimants may appear
and be heard in a Chapter 11 case), af'd, 52 B.R. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
2 See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Rapid Am. Corp. (In reCelotex Corp.), 124 F.3d 619,
622 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing Celotex Corporation's Chapter 11 petition).
3 See In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 197 B.R. 260, 263-64 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996) (ap-
proving of a consolidated Chapter 11 settlement agreement and rejecting all proce-
dural arguments attempting to disallow the agreement).
4 See In re Keene Corp., 208 B.R. 112, 113 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (presenting the
background of Keene Corporation's Chapter 11 case).
5 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 696-97 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining A.H.
Robins Company's reorganization plan).
6 See In reDow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 551-54 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (de-
tailing the history of the silicone breast implant litigation and Dow Coming's resulting
bankruptcy action).
7 See, eg., Jeffrey Davis, Cramming Down Future Claims in Bankrupty: Fairness, Bank-
ruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Lessons of the Piper Reorganization, 70 AM. BANKR. LJ.
329, 330 (1996) (discussing the Piper Aircraft Corporation litigation and its implica-
tions on future claims in the bankruptcy process); Kathryn R. Heidt, Future Claims in
Bankruptcy: The NBC Amendments Do Not Go Far Enough, 69 AM. BANKR. LJ. 515, 515
(1995) [hereinafter Heidt, Future Claims] (critiquing the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence ("NBC") amendments and advocating amendments that recognize claims as aris-
ing "at the time the debtor commits the act on which liability is based"); Kathryn R.
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such as the National Bankruptcy Conference,8 have studied the special
problems relating to the treatment of mass tort claims in bankruptcy
and have made recommendations for law reform in this area. Most
notably, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission9 had recom-
mended several revisions to the Bankruptcy Code to enable bank-
ruptcy courts to better deal with mass tort liability involving numerous
future claims arising from the debtor's prebankruptcy conduct.10 In
addition, in 1994 Congress added provisions to the Bankruptcy Code
Heidt, Products Liability, Mass Torts and Environmental Obligations in Bankruptc: Sugges-
tionsfor Reform?, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 117, 117 (1995) [hereinafter Heidt, Prod-
ucts Liability] (suggesting methods of reform for dealing with extraordinary obligations
in bankruptcy); BarbaraJ. Houser, Chapter 11 As a Mass Tort Solution, 31 LOY. LA. L.
REV. 451, 452 (1998) (asserting Chapter 11 as an appropriate means for resolving mass
tort claims); Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy
Courts Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1695, 1696 (1998) (advocating "caution be-
fore bankruptcy courts enter deeper into the mass tort litigation fray"); Ralph R. Ma-
bey &Jamie Andra Gavrin, Constitutional Limitations on the Discharge of Future Claims in
Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L. REv. 745, 749 (1993) (analyzing "head-on the constitutional un-
derpinnings for the discharge of future claims"); Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser,
Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The Unfinished Business Left by the Manville Amend-
ments, 69 AM. BANiK. LJ. 487, 488 (1995) (advocating adoption of the NBC amend-
ments); Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104YALE
L.J. 367, 370-71 (1994) (addressing issues of fairness in "allocation to future claimants
in a mass tort bankruptcy"); Greg M. Zipes, After Amchem and Ahearn: The Rise of
Bankruptcy over the Class Action Option for Resolving Mass Torts on a Nationwide Basis, and
the Fall of Finality?, 1998 DET. C.L MICH. ST. U.L. REV. 7, 12 (discussing the necessity
for companies to tolerate uncertainty while courts determine how to balance the di-
vergent concerns of claimants and debtors).
8 The National Bankruptcy Conference is a voluntary, non-profit, self-supporting
organization formalized in the 1940s from a group of leading bankruptcy scholars
gathered informally in the 1930s to assist Congress in revising the bankruptcy laws. It
consists of approximately 70 lawyers, judges, and law professors elected to member-
ship. Its purpose is to study in a continuing program the operation of bankruptcy and
related laws and to consult with Congress from time to time on needed revisions. In
1994, after a comprehensive review of the operation of the bankruptcy laws during the
first 10 years of the Bankruptcy Code, the Conference published a report. See
NATIONAL BANER. CONF., REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: THE NATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEV PROjECT i (1994). A revised edition of the
report was published in 1997. See NATIONAL BANKR. CONF., REFORMING TBE
BANKRUPTCY CODE: THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW
PROJECT: FINAL REPORT, REVISED EDITION 43 (1997) [hereinafter NBC CODE REVIEW
PROJECT REPORT] (summarizing proposals for a revised statutory mechanism).
9 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission was established by Congress in
1994 to study and make recommendations for improving the. bankruptcy system. See
National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 103-394, tit. VI, 108 Stat.
4147, 4147-50 (1994) (establishing the National Bankruptcy Review Commission).
'0 See NATIONAL BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: TBE NEXT TWENTY YEARS:
NATIONALBANKRUPTCYREVIEW COmMISsION FINAL REPORT 315-50 (1997) [hereinafter
NBRC REPORT] (discussing the treatment of mass future claims in bankruptcy).
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specifically dealing with the treatment of asbestos-related liability."
The growth of the mass tort phenomenon during the past twenty
years also has caused the federal judiciary to consider procedural im-
provements for the collective resolution of mass tort liability. After
several years of studying this matter, the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended
that ChiefJustice William H. Rehnquist appoint an informal working
group to study mass torts.12 The Working Group was formed in 1998
and, after a year of study, produced a report focusing on the prob-
lems, competing views, and possible approaches to mass torts, while
recommending further study.'3
The purpose of this Article is to discuss the positive features of the
present bankruptcy system that, in general, make it a fair and effective
vehicle for dealing with mass tort liability. This Article will then sug-
gest improvements to make bankruptcy an even more effective
mechanism for dealing with mass tort cases.
It is not the purpose of this paper to advocate that bankruptcy is
the only, or even the best, mechanism for dealing with mass tort liabil-
ity in all situations. 4 Ideally, class actions, multidistrict litigation, al-
n See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g), (h) (1994) (dealing with courts' authority to issue injunc-
tions giving effect to a discharge of an asbestos-related liability).
12 See ADvISORY COMM. ON CIvIL RULES AND WOPE[NG GROUP ON MASS TORTS,
REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION 1 (Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON MASS
TORT LITIGATION] (noting that the Working Group was formed "in response to the
Judicial Conference's interest in reviewing the mass torts phenomenon and the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee's recommendation for a single effort working across the
Conference committees'jurisdictional lines").
13 See id. at 48-70 (setting forth "Potential Solutions for Consideration" and a "Pro-
tocol for Further Action").
14 Several commentators have compared the bankruptcy system to class actions and
other nonbankruptcy mechanisms for resolving mass tort liability. See, e.g., Stuart M.
Bernstein, Mass Torts and Bankruptcy, LITIGATION, Fall 1997, at 5, 66 ("Class ac-
tions ... lack many of the procedural safeguards and certainties found in bank-
ruptcy."); Mabey & Zisser, supra note 7, at 506 ("The Bankruptcy Clause and the Bank-
ruptcy Code already provide the best framework for treating present and future victims
of the same faulty product equitably and economically."); Zipes, supra note 7, at 61
(focusing on the need to address uncertainties with both bankruptcy and class actions
and concluding that, for the meantime, neither device will bring finality for a corpora-
tion facing mass tort liability).
Additionally, two commentators have written a comparative analysis of settlement
class actions and bankruptcy cases in the mass tort context. SeeJoseph F. Rice & Nancy
Worth Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims: Comparison of Settlement Class Action to Bank-
ruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort Claims, 50 S.C. L. REV. 405, 410 (1999) (introducing the
comparison of "settlement class actions with Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations in
the resolution of mass tort claims"). Except for a brief discussion of prepackaged
bankruptcies in which a plan of reorganization is approved by the parties prior to
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ternative dispute resolution, and other vehicles for resolving mass tort
liability will continue to improve as mechanisms for dealing with mass
tort cases. When other mechanisms fail or are likely to be ineffective,
and survival of the enterprise is threatened, however, companies with
otherwise viable businesses will seek protection under the federal
bankruptcy laws. The improvement of the bankruptcy system in the
treatment of mass tort liability, therefore, should be a part of any
comprehensive plan to improve the mechanisms for addressing mass
tort liability in the American judicial system.
I. FEATURES THAT MAKE THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM AN APPROPRIATE
FRAMEWORK FOR DEAING WITH MASS TORT LIABILTTY
A. Treatment ofEnterprise-ThreateningMass Tort Liability in the Context
of a Chapter 11 Reorganization Case Is Consistent
with the Purposes of the Bankruptcy System
Traditional tort litigation and nonbankruptcy collective proceed-
ings, including class actions, are designed to grant plaintiffs appropri-
ate relief for their injuries without regard to the financial condition of
the defendant.15 The money judgment obtained may be enforced re-
gardiess of the consequences to the defendant's viability. Although
settlement negotiations often take into account the inability of the de-
fendant to satisfy a probable award, judges and juries may not con-
sider the debtor's financial health when awarding compensatory dam-
16ages.
commencement of the bankruptcy case, Rice and Davis compare class actions in which
a settlement was reached before filing the action with traditional Chapter 11 cases in
which no settlement was reached before the bankruptcy petition was filed. See id. Not
surprisingly, the authors found that settlement class actions come without the delay and
transaction costs present in traditional nonsettled bankruptcy cases. See id. at 460. The
article criticizes the bankruptcy system, but ultimately concludes:
Both settlement class action and Chapter 11 reorganization, if used properly,
hold promise for resolution of mass tort claims. Neither should be discarded
due to prevailing biases favoring one solution over the other. Each should be
allowed to evolve so that mass tort claimants have choices available to them for
the fair and equitable compensation of their injuries.
Id. at 461.
's See, e.g., Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9their. 1977) (noting
that it has been widely held by courts that the defendant's financial standing is inad-
missible in determining the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded); Eisen-
hauer v. Burger, 431 F.2d 833, 837 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that evidence of the size of
the defendant's trucking company was inadmissible to affect damage award).
'6 See Eisenhauer, 431 F.2d at 837 (holding the worth of defendant's company not
admissible in determining damages).
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In contrast, while liability is determined and disputed or unliqui-
dated claims are fixed or estimated in a Chapter 11 case without re-
gard to the debtor's financial condition,'7 that process is only one as-
pect of the case. The primary goals of reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Code are to provide "equality of distribution to similar
creditors in a collective proceeding while ameliorating the devastating
effect that a huge liability may have on the worth of a business and,
correspondingly, the compensation available to all victims." 18 The
protection of the business enterprise by preserving its going concern
value, thereby maximizing value for distribution to creditors, is central
to the reorganization process.
The use of bankruptcy to protect a business whose viability is
threatened by mass tort liability is not foreign to these underlying
goals of the Bankruptcy Code. When a company has committed tor-
tious conduct on a massive scale affecting thousands of victims, includ-
ing those who have not yet manifested injury, all constituents would
be disadvantaged by the destruction or termination of the business if
it is otherwise viable. Those claimants whose injuries are manifested
subsequent to the termination of the defendant business will have
nowhere to turn for compensation. Despite its allegedly wrongful
conduct, it will not benefit anyone to kill the goose that is laying the
golden eggs. Rather, a plan devoting the future profits of the com-
pany, at least in part, to the compensation of present and future
claimants offers the greatest likelihood that they will be compensated
for their injuries. Bankruptcy's goal of providing equal treatment
among similarly situated creditors also coincides with the difficult
challenge of treating present claimants no better and no worse than
unknown future claimants in mass tort cases.
B. Nationwide Jutisdiction and the Automatic Stay
Professor Edward H. Cooper has posited as a goal for dealing with
mass torts the achievement of "a single, uniform, fair, and efficient
resolution of all claims growing out of a set of events so related as to
be a 'mass tort.'"'9 To achieve this goal, he calls for eleven changes in
the current framework of jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive
17 See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1994) (governing the allowance of claims).
'8 NBRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 318-19 (citing Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S.
151, 154 (1991)).
'9 Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 947
(1998).
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laws and rules.2' The first change on his list is to empower a single
court to control all litigation events, select cases for mass torts treat-
ment, and enjoin litigation in other courts' A district court exercis-
ing bankruptcy jurisdiction, or a bankruptcy court to which the case
has been referred by a district court, may be such a court.
The deluge of mass tort litigation against a company often arises
in multiple jurisdictions governed by different procedural and sub-
stantive laws. Duplication of discovery and other procedural steps
greatly increases the financial and operational burdens on the defen-
dant. Even class actions may arise in different jurisdictions, each with
a different, narrowly crafted class. In contrast, the American bank-
ruptcy system is governed by federal law designed to bring all disputes
and claims regarding the debtor into one system. The Framers of the
Constitution, anticipating the need for a single national system gov-
erning claims against distressed debtors, provided that Congress shall
have the power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bank-
ruptcies throughout the United States."2
Bankruptcy jurisdiction is vested in the federal district court.! In
20 See id. at 947-62. The 11 changes are: (1) centralize all actions in a particular
mass tort in one court, id. at 948; (2) consistently apply federal law, id, at 949; (3) allow
the centralized court power to enjoin related proceedings, and (4) select counsel, id.;
(5) provide good representation and adequate notice, id. at 950; (6) avoid premature
efforts at resolution, id.; (7) seed the landscape with well-informed settlement terms,
id.; (8) involve claimants in the settlement, id.; (9) appoint an independent represen-
tative distinguished from counsel, id.; (10) involve the court in settlement; and (11)
afford objectors discovery of the negotiation process, id.
21 See id. at 947-49 (discussing the single court approach).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. State statutes attempting to provide a discharge of
debts have been invalidated. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261,
265-66 (1929) (stating that state bankruptcy regulations were superseded by federal
bankruptcy law, especially in light of the congressional intent to establish uniformity in
this area); In reNewport Offshore Ltd., 219 B.R. 341, 353 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) ("State
laws that operate to effect, or to coerce from creditors, the insolvent debtor's discharge
or release from indebtedness are preempted."). It would not surprise this author if
non-opt-out, "limited fund" class actions under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were held to be an improper use of the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1994), because of Congress's exclusive bankruptcy power. See Flanagan
v. Ahearn (In reAsbestos Litig.), 134 F.3d 668, 674 (5th Cir. 1998) (Smith, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that certification of a class may have violated "principles of federalism
and the limits of the Rules Enabling Act"), rev'd sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
2' See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994) (grantingjurisdiction in bankruptcy cases to the fed-
eral district court). For a discussion of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, including the
historical evolution of the present jurisdictional scheme, see Ralph Brubaker, On the
Nature of Federal BankruptcyJurisdiction: A General Statutoy and Constitutional Theory, 41
WM. & MAYL. REV. 743 (2000).
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addition to exclusive jurisdiction over a bankruptcy case, the district
court in which the case is pending has original, but not exclusive, ju-
risdiction over all civil proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy
Code or arising in "or related to" the bankruptcy case 4.2  The district
court in which the case is pending has exclusive jurisdiction over all
the debtor's property, wherever located, as of the commencement of
the case, and over all property of the bankruptcy estate.n The Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide that the service of a summons,
complaint, and all other process, except a subpoena, may be served
anywhere in the United States.2 ' Title 28 of the United States Code
permits the district court to refer the bankruptcy case and related
proceedings to a bankruptcy judge. In nearly all districts, bank-
ruptcy cases and proceedings are routinely referred to the bankruptcy
court. At any time, the district court may withdraw the reference, in
whole or in part, with respect to the bankruptcy case or a particular
proceeding. s
When a company facing mass tort liability files a bankruptcy peti-
tion, it is typical for numerous personal injury and wrongful death tort
actions to be pending in state and federal courts throughout the
United States. Section 157(b) (5) of Title 28 provides that such claims
shall be tried in the district court where the bankruptcy case is pend-
ing or in the district court where the claim arose, as determined by
the district court where the bankruptcy case is pending.2 The statute
has been construed, however, to permit the bankruptcy court to esti-
mate personal injury and wrongful death claims for the purposes of
24 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b); see also id. § 1452 (providing for removal of claims and
causes of action to the district court if it would have jurisdiction under
§ 134); i& § 1334(c) (allowing for abstention).
See idU § 1334(e) (granting exclusivejurisdiction to the district court).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d) (allowing nationwide service of process). This rule
applies in adversary proceedings and contested matters. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014
(governing contested matters under the Bankruptcy Code).
2 See id. § 157(a) (allowing a district court to refer a bankruptcy case and proceed-
ings to a bankruptcyjudge).
2 See i&. § 157(d) (providing that the district court may withdraw the reference on
its own motion or on the motion of a party).
29 See id § 157(b) (5) ("The district court should order that personal injury
tort.., claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pend-
ing."). The purpose of this provision is to centralize the administration of the estate
and eliminate the multiplicity of tribunals for the adjudication of parts of a bankruptcy
case. See A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1011 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing
the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (5)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (1994) (preserving
an individual's right to trial byjury with respect to personal injury and wrongful death
tort claims).
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facilitating the formulation of a Chapter 11 plan, determining voting
rights, and measuring plan feasibility.3' In addition, despite the man-
datory language of § 157(b) (5), courts have held that the district
court has discretion to abstain from presiding over a personal injury
or wrongful death trial and may permit the claim to proceed in the
state or federal court where it was pending when the petition was
originally filed.3' For distribution purposes, these claims also may be
determined according to a voluntary claims resolution procedure pro-
vided under a Chapter 11 plan. But if the claimant does not consent
to a claims resolution procedure, and a trial is required to determine
the amount of the claim for distribution purposes, § 157(b) (5) gives
the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending discretion
to determine where the trial will proceed.33 The result is that the dis-
trict court for the district in which the bankruptcy case is pending
could bring all trials in personal injury and wrongful death actions
M Courts have construed § 157(b) (5) together with § 157(b) (2) (B), which gives
the bankruptcy court the power to hear and determine matters regarding the allow-
ance or disallowance of claims and the estimation of claims for purposes of confirming
a plan, but not the liquidation or estimation of personal injury or wrongful death
claims "for purposes of distribution." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2) (B). See, e.g., Grzybowski v.
Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp. (In reAquaslide 'N' Dive Corp.), 85 B.R. 545, 549 (BAP. 9th
Cir. 1987) (affirming the lower court's ruling as an estimation of claims for the pur-
pose of confirming a plan under Chapter 11, rather than as a substitution for ajury's
verdict on the plaintiff's tort claim); In re Farley, Inc., 146 B.R. 748, 752-53 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1992) (stating that the court has authority to hear an estimation proceeding
for purposes of confirming a plan under Chapter 11 but not to liquidate personal in-
jury claims); see also In rePoole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 63 B.R. 527, 533 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1986) ("[T]he estimation of claims, including the estimation of personal injury tort
claims for the purpose of confirming a plan under Chapter 11, is a core proceeding as
to which Movants are not entitled to a trial byjury.").
3' See, eg., Coker v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Pan Am. Corp.), 950 F.2d
839, 844 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court had authority to abstain from
wrongful death actions pending in state court arising out of an airplane crash in Scot-
land). The court stated, "Despite the apparently mandatory 'shall order', section
157(b) (5) has consistently been construed to recognize discretion in district courts to
leave personal injury cases where they are pending." Id.
32 See In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 743-44 (4th Cir. 1989) (describing
claims resolution facility under a Chapter 11 plan in which a trust established for the
benefit of Dalkon Shield claimants makes an initial settlement offer to each claimant
and, if the offer is rejected, the claimant may opt to have the claim submitted to arbi-
tration or to have it determined by jury trial); see also Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 617, 633 (1992)
(discussing optional claims resolution procedure under the reorganization plan in
A.H. Robins).
-" 'The district court shall order that... claims shall be tried in the district court in
which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in which
the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is
pending." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (5).
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against the debtor into that court.3 Again, the laws governingjuris-
diction in the bankruptcy context all point to bringing mass tort litiga-
tion into one court.
When a bankruptcy petition is filed, an automatic stay prevents
the continuation of litigation against the debtor in any tribunal.as The
automatic stay has nationwide effect and is a powerful way to halt
immediately all actions, including mass tort lawsuits pending in state
or other federal courts. Creditors seeking recovery must pursue their
claims against the bankruptcy estate by filing proofs of claim in the
bankruptcy court within the time specified by the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure or by court order!'
The automatic stay does not apply to actions against co-defendants
or other third parties who are not in bankruptcy. Courts, however,
have relied on § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code as authority for ex-
tending the automatic stay to enjoin litigation against third parties
under certain circumstances. For example, in A.H. Robins Co. v. Picc-
nin, the court of appeals upheld the bankruptcy court's stay of litiga-
tion against the debtor's insurance companies!ss
The combination of the automatic stay and the broad federal ju-
risdictional scheme in bankruptcy cases effectively brings the control
of all litigation against the debtor under one roof.
"For a list of factors used by district courts in determining whether to transfer all
pending personal injury and wrongful death actions to the district court where the
bankruptcy case is pending, see Houser, supra note 7, at 457.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (detailing the situations in which
stays are applicable).
mCourts have also held that the automatic stay has worldwide effect if the creditor
has sufficient minimum contacts with the United States. See, e.g., Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v.
Hanseatic Marine Serv. (In reLykes Bros. S.S. Co.), 207 B.R. 282, 285-87 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1997) (holding that so long as the minimum contacts requirement is satisfied, the
automatic stay applies to all of the debtor's property, including property located out-
side of the United States).
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (1994) (permitting a creditor to file a proof of claim); FED. R.
BANKR. P. 3002 (listing the necessity for filing, the place of filing, and the time for fil-
ing in a Chapter 7 liquidation); FED. R. BANKRL P. 3003 (listing filing rules in a Chapter
11 reorganization case). A proof of claim is "deemed filed" in a Chapter 11 case if it
appears on the schedule of liabilities filed with the court, unless it is scheduled as dis-
puted, contingent, or unliquidated. 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (a) (1994).
' 788 F.2d 994, 1003 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that § 105(a) grants the bankruptcy
court power to extend the automatic stay to protect non-debtor parties); see also
Houser, supra note 7, at 453-55 (discussing A.H. Robins).
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C. Timely Access to the Bankruptcy System
The likelihood of saving a business facing inevitable financial dif-
ficulties, preserving its going concern value, and maximizing distribu-
tions to creditors is often increased when the business seeks bank-
ruptcy protection before it becomes insolvent on a balance sheet basis
or is unable to pay its debts as they mature. The need for early access
to bankruptcy relief-before the debtor's ability to financially reha-
bilitate its business becomes hopeless-was recognized by the drafters
of the Bankruptcy Code. To permit such early access to the bank-
ruptcy system, a debtor's eligibility for relief under either Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code does not depend on the debtor's
insolvency when the petition is filed!9 For this reason, a company be-
ginning to face a deluge of mass tort litigation may seek Chapter 11
protection before its capital markets and trade credit disappear or the
business is otherwise damaged.
The absence of an insolvency test for eligibility is also attractive
because proving insolvency, which requires the valuation of all assets
and liabilities, is a very difficult, subjective process, resulting in expen-
S9 ee 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994) (setting forth the requirements for eligibility for relief
under the Bankruptcy Code); see also United States v. Huebner, 48 F.3d 376, 379 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("The Bankruptcy Act does not require any particular degree of financial
distress as a condition precedent to a petition seeking relief."); In rejames Wilson As-
soc., 965 F.2d 160, 170 (7th Cir. 1992) ("One might have supposed that the clearest
case of bad faith would be filing for bankruptcy knowing that one was not bankrupt,
but the Bankruptcy Code permits an individual or firm that has debts to declare bank-
ruptcy even though he (or it) is not insolvent."); In reJohns-Manville Corp., 36 B.L
727, 732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[N]either Section 109 nor any other provision relat-
ing to voluntary petitions by companies contains any insolvency requirement."); cf. In
reSGL Carbon Corp., 1999 WL 1268082 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that a corporation
does not have to be insolvent to file a Chapter 11 petition and that the Bankruptcy
Code allows early access to bankruptcy relief to allow a debtor to reorganize before it is
faced with a hopeless situation, but holding that the petition of a financially healthy
company facing antitrust lawsuits was filed in bad faith because it was filed as a litiga-
tion tactic and without a valid reorganizational purpose) (citing this Article).
It should be noted that when a company goes through the bankruptcy system re-
maining solvent, creditors should receive full payment of their claims. In a Chapter 7
liquidation, creditors must be paid after administrative expenses are paid, and excess
value is distributed to shareholders. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994) (listing the order of re-
cipients to whom assets are distributed in a Chapter 7 liquidation). In a Chapter 11
case, as will be discussed below, the requirement that each creditor receive in value at
least as much as it would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation results in full payment if
the debtor remains solvent after paying administrative expenses. See iti §
1129 (a) (7) (A) (listing the requirements necessary for a court to confirm a Chapter 11
plan).
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sive and time-consuming litigation when the debtor is a large, com-
plex corporation.
The ability to seek bankruptcy protection earlier, rather than
later, can be contrasted with the more limited access to a non-opt-out
"limited fund" class action under Rule 23(b) (1) (B). In Ortiz v. Fibre-
board Corp., the Supreme Court reversed a $1.535 billion class action
settlement in part because the parties failed to show that the assets
available for distribution to tort victims, including insurance proceeds,
were, in fact, a limited fund that would be insufficient to pay claims in
full.40 Although the Court commented that "[w]e need not decide
here how close to insolvency a limited fund defendant must be
brought as a condition of class certification," it is clear that insuffi-
ciency of assets must be demonstrated.41 This would require a valua-
tion of assets and estimation of liabilities to show at least near insol-
vency.
D. Acceleration and Estimation of Unmatured
and Contingent Claims
An important goal in resolving mass tort liability that affects future
claimants is assuring that present tort claimants with manifested inju-
ries and causes of action do not exhaust the defendant's assets before
future claimants manifest injuries. Similarly, future claimants who will
manifest injuries in the short term must not exhaust available assets if
exhaustion will result in fewer assets being available for those with
longer latency periods. These problems may be addressed by both at-
tempting to estimate the number and amount of future claims, and by
putting aside sufficient funds to compensate future claimants as inju-
ries mature. The Bankruptcy Code, with its provisions for accelera-
tion, estimation, and classification of claims that have not yet ripened
into matured causes of action, provides an appropriate framework for
dealing with these problems.
In bankruptcy, there is great significance in determining whether
an obligation is a "claim." In general, only the holder of a "claim"
may vote as a creditor on a Chapter 11 plan, file a proof of claim,4 or
40 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2321 (1999) (holding improper the use of a lim-
ited fund class action settlement where Fibreboard would retain all but $500,000 of its
net worth).
' Id. at 2321 n.34.
42 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) ("The holder of a claim or interest allowed under section
502 of this title may accept or reject a plan.").
4 See id § 501 (a) (providing that a "creditor" may file a proof of claim). "Creditor"
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receive a distribution in the bankruptcy case.44 In addition, only
"debts" may be discharged." "Debt," according to the Bankruptcy
Code, means "liability on a claim."46 In order to provide the most ef-
fective relief for the debtor and the widest participation by affected
parties, Congress defined "claim" as broadly as possible. Under
§ 101 (5) of the Bankruptcy Code, "claim" is defined to include unma-
tured, contingent, and unliquidated obligations, as well as matured,
fixed, and liquidated obligations. Regardless of whether a cause of
action has accrued under state law, the right to receive payment at
some future time is as much a "claim" as is an obligation that consti-
tutes a ripe cause of action when the bankruptcy petition is filed. For
example, a contractual obligation to pay a debt in the year 2005 is
considered a "claim" if the debtor files a bankruptcy petition in 1999,
even though the lender would not have the right to any remedy under
state law before the due date of the loan. In essence, bankruptcy ac-
celerates the maturity of all unmatured claims.
This premise is illustrated by the following example: Suppose the
debtor has a contingent claim and the contingency has not, and per-
haps never will, occur. Assume that Corporation A has guaranteed
Corporation B's bank loan, which becomes due in five years. If Cor-
poration B is in good financial condition and is likely to repay the
loan in full in five years, Corporation A will most likely never be called
upon to pay anything to the bank. If Corporation A files a bankruptcy
petition, however, the bank would have a contingent claim against the
debtor and would be treated as a creditor under the Bankruptcy
Code. The bank's claim against Corporation A would be discharged,
and the bank would have the right to participate and possibly receive
a distribution in the bankruptcy case. The bank would have no right
to sue Corporation A outside of bankruptcy, however, because Corpo-
ration B had not defaulted on the bank loan.
When waiting for the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the con-
tingency on a contingent claim would unduly delay the administration
is defined to mean, with few exceptions, an entity that has a claim against the debtor
that arose on or before the order for relief. See id. § 101(10) (A) (defining the term
"creditor").
44 See id. § 726 (listing the recipients' property distribution in a bankruptcy case);
FED. R. BANKE. P. 3021 (same).
* See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (discharging the debtor from any "debt" after fulfilling
other statutory requirements); id. § 1141(d) (providing that a plan or an order con-
firming a plan discharges the debtor from any "debt").
SId. § 101(12).
4 See id. § 101(5) (defining the term "claim").
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of the bankruptcy case, the Bankruptcy Code mandates that the court
estimate the claim for the purpose of allowing it.4 In the situation de-
scribed above, the amount of the claim for allowance purposes should
be estimated by the court, based on the likelihood of a Corporation B
default. The Bankruptcy Code also requires the court to estimate un-
liquidated claims if liquidation of the claim would unduly delay the
administration of the case.4 9
Given the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of unmatured and con-
tingent rights to payment as "claims," it seems natural for future mass
tort liability arising from prebankruptcy conduct of the debtor also to
be included within that definition. Any future right to payment
caused by prebankruptcy conduct, regardless of whether it will ever be
triggered or ripen into a cause of action by the manifestation of in-
jury, should fit neatly into the Bankruptcy Code's broad definition of
"claim" and its estimation provisions.
50
E. Tlxibility in Claims Classification
The Bankruptcy Code requires that a Chapter 11 plan of reor-
ganization place claims in classes.51 The only statutory restriction on
43 See id § 502 (c) (1) (requiring the court to estimate any contingent claim that
"would unduly delay the administration of the case").
'9 See id. Although estimation is required in these situations, the Bankruptcy Code
does not specify any method for the court to use when estimating claims. See generally
Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co., 691 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting the Bankruptcy
Code's silence regarding the manner in which to estimate claims); In re Farley, Inc.,
146 B.R. 748, 753 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (noting that courts should use whatever
claims estimation method is best under the circumstances). For a discussion of various
models used by bankruptcy courts to estimate claims, see David S. Salsburg &Jack F.
Williams, A Statistical Approach to Claims Estimation in Bankrupty, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1119, 1130-38 (1997).
N But see In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 563 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997)
(denying the Chapter 11 debtor's motion to estimate mass tort claims relating to the
manufacture of breast implants and holding that there was insufficient cause for esti-
mation). The court stated:
From the plain language of § 502(c), it is clear that estimation does not be-
come mandatory merely because liquidation may take longer and thereby de-
lay administration of the case. Liquidation of a claim, in fact, will almost al-
ways be more time consuming than estimation. Nonetheless, bankruptcy law's
general rule is to liquidate, not to estimate. For estimation to be mandatory,
then, the delay associated with liquidation must be "undue."
Id. The court noted that "undue" means "unjustifiable." Id.
-" See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (1) (designating which claims are placed in classes). The
only claims that are not placed in classes are administrative expense claims, claims aris-
ing after an involuntary petition is filed and before the order for relief, and priority tax
claims. See id.
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classification is that only similar claims may be placed in the same
class! 2 This similarity requirement usually means that the claims must
be in the same distributive rank. For example, an unsecured, past-due
bank claim differs in many ways from an unliquidated personal injury
tort claim. For Chapter 11 purposes, however, these two claims may
be placed in the same class and treated equally because they are both
of equal rank in that they would share pro rata in any distribution if
the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7."
Claims that differ in their maturity are typically classified together
and treated equally under a Chapter 11 plan. For example, suppose a
company has an unsecured bank loan that became due and payable
several months ago, and also issued an unsecured zero coupon bond
that will not become due for another five years. Assume further that
the debtor already defaulted on the bank loan, but is not required to
make any payments for another five years with respect to the outstand-
ing bond. In the absence of a bankruptcy filing, the bank would be
able to sue on the defaulted loan, recover ajudgment, and enforce it
against the defendant's assets now, while the bondholder would have
no cause of action or remedy until the debtor defaults in five years.
The bank would currently recover full payment by enforcing its reme-
dies against the debtor's assets under nonbankruptcy law, while the
bondholder would receive no recovery because the debtor will have
no assets when the bond becomes due in five years. If the debtor were
to file a bankruptcy petition now, however, these two claims could be
classified together and given the same distribution under the plan.
The requirements that a Chapter 11 plan place virtually all credi-
tors in classes, that members of each class be similarly situated, and
that the plan treat class members equally with others in the same class
gives a Chapter 11 case the appearance, in structure, of a class action
with multiple non-opt-out classes. The classification of claims under a
Chapter 11 plan differs significantly, however, from the creation of a
class for Rule 23 class action purposes.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the "substantially similar" require-
52 See id § 1122(a) (permitting only substantially similar claims or interests in the
same class); see also id. § 1122(b) (permitting the designation of a separate class of
claims consisting only of each unsecured claim that is either less than or reduced to an
amount that the court approves as reasonably necessary for administrative conven-
ience).
'" See, e.g., In reAOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting
appellant's argument that his claim should be separated from the class of other unse-
cured claims because he had a third party guarantee); William Blair, Classification of
Unsecured Claims in Chapter 11 Reorganization, 58 AM. BANK. L.J. 197 (1984).
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ment in § 1122(a) is far less restrictive than the four threshold re-
quirements applicable to class actions under Rule 23. As mentioned
above, claims placed in a Chapter 11 class usually will satisfy the "sub-
stantially similar" requirement if they are of equal rank in distribution.
For a class to be certified under Rule 23, regardless of the category
of class action under Rule 23(b), the court must find: (1) "numeros-
ity" (the class is so large that joinder of all members would not be
practical); (2) "commonality" (there are questions of law or fact
common to the class members); (3) "typicality" (claims and defenses
of the named parties are typical of those of the class); and (4) "ade-
quacy of representation" (representatives will fairly and adequately
protect the class members' interests).- The less restrictive classifica-
tion requirements of the Bankruptcy Code afford greater flexibility in
classifying tort and other unsecured claims in a Chapter 11 plan in-
volving mass tort liability.55
F. The Ability To Impair Classes: BringingEveryone
to the Bargaining Table and Sharing the Pain
A Chapter 11 plan may impair, or leave unimpaired, any class of
claims or equity interests.- By placing creditors and shareholders in
classes and impairing some or all classes, a Chapter 11 reorganization
case may be viewed as the functional equivalent of multiple class ac-
tions with the potential to alter the rights of several groups in one
proceeding.
For example, suppose that a corporation manufactured a defec-
tive product and is now facing thousands of personal injury actions.
The corporation also has outstanding unsecured bonds with an ag-
gregate face amount of $1.2 billion. Suppose further that the corpo-
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (citing Benjamin
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REy. 356, 375-400 (1967) (delineating the threshold re-
quirements applicable to all class actions)).
55
Bankruptcy thereby deals with commonality and typicality issues differently
from Article M courts acting under Rule 23's dictates. As the bankruptcy sys-
tem seeks to provide similarly situated creditors with equal treatment, in the-
ory at least the Bankruptcy Code assigns no distinction between future and
present injuries of the same kind. It lumps this group into the same general
category, as a pre-petition, unsecured debt.
Zipes, supra note 7, at 44.
m See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (a) (2) (requiring that any class of claims or interests not im-
paired under the plan be specified); id, § 1123(a) (3) (requiring that treatment of any
impaired class be specified); id. § 1124 (defining impairment of claims or interests).
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ration does not have sufficient funds to pay full compensation to the
tort victims and to honor its commitments to the bondholders. In
traditional one-on-one tort litigation with each victim, the parties may
eventually settle the claim by paying an amount equal to only a per-
centage of the victim's actual compensatory damages. Similarly, in a
class action commenced on behalf of the tort victims, a settlement
may provide for less than full compensation to class members. In ei-
ther case, the bondholders would not be parties to the litigation and
could not be compelled to reduce the amount of the debtor's bond
liability. In a Chapter 11 case, however, the bondholders could be
placed in a class, and the reorganization plan could propose changes
to the terms of the bonds, such as a reduction of the face amount or a
change in the interest rate or maturity date.
Permitting impairment of several classes of creditors and equity
interest holders in one case effectively forces all entities with a finan-
cial interest in the debtor to come to the bargaining table. If the
debtor's enterprise is threatened by mass tort liability, and the only
feasible solution is to pay present and future claimants an amount that
is less than what they would receive from one-on-one litigation, it may
be unfair to tort victims to leave intact the legal rights of other credi-
tor and shareholder groups. Why should the corporation's financial
difficulties, caused primarily by mass tort liability based on a defective
product, fall solely on the tort victims? Rather, unsecured bondhold-
ers and other creditors, as well as shareholders, should share the pain
of the corporation's financial difficulties. By giving the proponent of
a Chapter 11 plan the ability to impair several classes, the bankruptcy
system provides a unique mechanism for spreading the loss faced by
mass tort liability among all creditor and shareholder groups.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the Bankruptcy Code
does not require the proponent of a plan to impair every class. In fact,
the Code provides that a class or classes may be left unimpaired by the
plan.57 This flexibility allows the proponent of the plan to permit one
or more classes to remain unaffected by the bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion. For example, a plan may provide that the class of unsecured
trade creditors will be unimpaired so that they will be assured of full
payment.s
57 See id. § 1123(a) (2) (noting the requirement that any unimpaired classes be
specified); id § 1124 (defining impairment of claims or interests).
- As the Mass Tort Working Group observed, "a reorganization could 'pass
through' all other obligations while resolving-and establishing outer liability limits
for-only a mass tort obligation. This procedure could achieve the same effects as a
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G. Creditor Representatives Are Selected by an Independent Official
and Professionals Are Employed with Court Approval
When a company reorganizes under Chapter 11, unsecured credi-
tors are represented by at least one committee of creditors selected by
the United States trustee, an official in the Executive Branch ap-
pointed by the Attorney General. 9 Each official committee is entitled
to retain professionals-typically an attorney, accountant, and invest-
ment advisor in large cases-who are selected by the committee and
employed only after court approval.60 Each professional must, as a
condition of employment, file an affidavit disclosing the person's
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, and
their attorneys and accountants.61 The United States trustee or any
party in interest may object to the professional's employment based
on conflicts of interest. Failure to make adequate disclosures, or serv-
ing despite a conflict of interest, may result in denial or disgorgement
of fees.62 This retention and disclosure process is an open one, allow-
ing for a complete airing of conflict issues under the watchful eye of
the United States trustee and the supervision of the court.
The concern for independent representation of future claimants
in mass tort cases has been heightened by the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Amchem Products, Inc. v. WindsoP and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.6
In Amchem, the Court held that a class proposed by a consortium of
former asbestos manufacturers in a settlement-only class action could
not be certified because, among other reasons, it could not satisfy the
adequate representation requirement of Rule 23. The named parties,
who had diverse medical conditions, sought to act on behalf of a sin-
gle large class of individuals who were injured by, or were exposed to,
asbestos. The Court held that, in significant respects, the interests of
mandatory, no-opt-out settlement class." REPORT ON MAss TORT LITIGATION, supra
note 12, at 59.
'9 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (1) (noting that such committee "shall ordinarily consist
of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor");
28 U.S.C. §§ 581-586 (1994) (providing for appointment of United States trustees who
are required to take an oath of office, whose official stations the Attorney General may
determine, and who may be appointed to vacant offices, and detailing trustees' duties).
60 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (detailing the procedural powers and duties of such com-
mittees).
61 See FED. R. BANKER. P. 2014 (detailing requirements for employment of profes-
sional persons).
62 See 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (authorizing denial of compensation or reimbursement in
the event of a conflict of interest).
63 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
" 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
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those within the class were not aligned. The most obvious conflict was
that, for the currently injured, the critical goal was generous, immedi-
ate payment, whereas the plaintiffs who were exposed to asbestos but
did not yet manifest any injuries were interested in ensuring an ample,
inflation-protected fund for the future. The Court concluded that
"[t]he settling parties, in sum, achieved a global compromise with no
structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the di-
verse groups and individuals affected."65
In Ortiz, the Court upset a limited fund class action settlement
against an asbestos manufacturer because, among other reasons, class
counsel had a conflict of interest.
[A]ny assumption that plaintiffs' counsel could be of a mind to do their
simple best in bargaining for the benefit of the settlement class is pat-
ently at odds with the fact that at least some of the same lawyers repre-
senting plaintiffs and the class had also negotiated the separate settle-
ment of 45,000 pending claims .... the full payment of which was
contingent on a successful global settlement agreement ....
The Court observed that "[c]lass counsel thus had great incentive
to reach any agreement in the global settlement negotiations that they
thought might survive a Rule 23(e) fairness hearing, rather than the
best possible arrangement for the substantially unidentified global set-
tlement class."67 That incentive "to favor the known plaintiffs in the
earlier settlement was, indeed, an egregious example of the conflict
noted in Amchem resulting from divergent interests of the presently in-
jured and future claimants. "68
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly provide for it,
bankruptcy courts have appointed legal representatives to represent
classes of future claimants in mass tort cases.6 If the bankruptcy court
applies the same standards for appointment and disclosure that are
applicable to creditors' committees and their counsel, conflicts of in-
terest criticized by the Supreme Court in Ortiz could be avoided.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627.
Ortx, 119 S. Ct. at 2317-18.
67 Id. at 2318.
6id "
' See, e.g., In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 261 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1996) (noting the request for appointment of a legal representative "'for future per-
sonal injury and property damage claimants'"); In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58
B.RL 476, 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (approving the debtor's application for appoint-
ment of a legal representative for future asbestos-related claimants).
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H. Chapter 11 Confirmation Requirements Are Designed
To Protect the Interests of Creditors
A plan of reorganization has no legal effect and does not bind
parties until it is confirmed by the bankruptcy court.70 Section 1129 of
the Bankruptcy Code lists specific requirements for confirmation of a
plan. These requirements, which are designed to protect the rights of
creditors and equity interest holders, should provide appropriate fi-
nancial protection for adequately represented classes of mass tort vic-
tims.71
1. The "Best Interest of Creditors" Test
The Bankruptcy Code requires that every creditor must either ac-
cept the plan or receive at least as much value as the creditor would
receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor.7 This requirement,
often called the "best interest of creditors test," means that every
creditor must receive at least the liquidation value of its claim or per-
sonally waive this protection by voting in favor of the plan. A class
vote may not waive this protection. If an unsecured creditor is owed
$100 and would receive $50 under the proposed Chapter 11 plan, but
would receive $60 if the company were liquidated in bankruptcy, that
creditor would have a veto power over the entire plan. This would be
so even if the creditor's claim were included in a class consisting of
1000 creditors owed a total of $1 billion and all the other members of
the class voted to accept the plan.
70 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1994) (indicating that only a confirmed plan binds par-
ties in interest).
7 These protections for creditors under the Bankruptcy Code were recently men-
tioned by the Supreme Court in Ort/iz
While there is no inherent conflict between a limited fund class action under
Rule 23(b) (1) (B) and the Bankruptcy Code, ... it is worth noting that if lim-
ited fund certification is allowed in a situation where a company provides only
a de minimis contribution to the ultimate settlement fund, the incentives such
a resolution would provide to companies facing tort liability to engineer set-
tlements similar to the one negotiated in this case would, in all likelihood,
significantly undermine the protections for creditors built into the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
119 S. Ct. at 2321 n.34 (citations omitted).
See ll U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7).
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2. The Absolute Priority Rule and Protection
Against Unfair Discrimination
Each impaired class is entitled to vote to accept or reject the
plan." A class of creditors accepts the plan if it is accepted by the
holders of a majority in number and two-thirds in dollar amount of
the claims held by those who actually vote on the plan.74
A plan may be confirmed despite rejection by a class, but only if
the plan is "fair and equitable" and does not unfairly discriminate with
respect to the non-accepting class.75 The fair and equitable require-
ment, often called the "absolute priority rule," is satisfied with respect
to a non-accepting class of unsecured creditors only if the members of
the class will receive property-which often includes cash, debt securi-
ties, or stock in the company-equal to the allowed amount of their
claims, or no junior creditor or shareholder will receive or retain any-
thing on account of its claim or interest. 6 The fair and equitable re-
quirement assures that no non-accepting class of creditors could be
compelled to accept less than full compensation while a more junior
creditor or equity holder receives anything or retains its interest. In
essence, shareholders must be wiped out before a less-than-full-
payment plan may be "crammed down" on a rejecting class of credi-
tors, including a class of tort claimants. This requirement could result
in the distribution of all of a debtor's equity to creditors so that they
Will own the company after the Chapter 11 case ends.
77
Similarly, a plan may not be confirmed if it unfairly discriminates
"3 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (1994) (stating that holders may accept or reject a plan).
74 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (stating the minimum requirements for creditors to ac-
cept a plan).
75 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
76 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (B) (describing the "fair and equitable" requirements as
applied to a class of unsecured claims). See generally Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. v.
203 North LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999) (holding that the new value
exception to the absolute priority rule prevents prebankruptcy equity holders from
purchasing new equity interests in the reorganized entity without allowing others to
compete or to propose a competing plan).
[T]he Bankruptcy Code, through its priority system and by shifting debtor's
resources from equity holders to other creditors in a plan of reorganization,
appropriately penalizes those who take the risk in investing in a company. In
contrast, class actions usually do no such thing: they set aside limited funds
for the payment of class action claims, while the company and its shareholders
escape potentially unscathed.
Zipes, supra note 7, at 10 (citation omitted).
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against a non-accepting class of creditors.78 For example, if a class of
unsecured bank creditors would receive a greater percentage of their
claims than an equally ranked non-accepting class of unsecured
bondholders, the plan could not be confirmed without a fair and justi-
fiable business reason for such discrimination among these classes.7
3. Feasibility
Whether or not all classes accept the plan, it may be confirmed
only if the court finds that it is "not likely to be followed by liquida-
tion, or the need for further financial reorganization of the debtor or
any successor to the debtor," unless the plan itself proposes such liq-
uidation or reorganization. 0 This requirement, often called the "fea-
sibility standard," is designed to give some assurance that the plan is
likely to work. That is, the debtor is likely to pay any future payments
proposed under the plan.
I. The Effects of Confirmation: Discharge,
Finality, and Global Peace
When a plan of reorganization is confirmed, it becomes binding
on all creditors and equity interest holders, as well as on the debtor
and any entity receiving property or issuing securities under the
plan-whether or not they voted to accept it.8' An objecting creditor
or shareholder has no way to opt out of the plan. Unless the plan
provides otherwise, all property of the bankruptcy estate is vested in
the debtor free and clear of all claims and interests,82 and the debtor
is forever discharged from all debts that arose before confirmation?83
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1) (providing that a court will not confirm a plan against
a non-accepting class if it discriminates unfairly).
9 Unequal treatment of classes of the same rank may be tolerated if "fair" under
the circumstances. See In re Rochem, Ltd., 58 B.R. 641, 643 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985) (ap-
plying four-part test to determine whether discriminating treatment is fair); In re Rat-
ledge, 31 B.R. 897, 900 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (holding that a Chapter 13 plan did
not unfairly discriminate against an unsecured creditor who, holding the largest claim,
would receive only 23% of its claim).
so 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11).
8' See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1994) (describing the effect of a confirmed plan on
above mentioned groups).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b), (c) (providing that confirmation of the plan vests prop-
erty in the debtor).
83 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1) (A) (providing that the plan confirmation discharges
the debtor from prior debts). The discharge applies whether or not (i) the creditor
filed a proof of claim, (ii) the claim was allowed, or (iii) the creditor has accepted the
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The only situation where a corporate debtor will not be discharged
from debts is when the plan is a "liquidating plan" that calls for the
liquidation of substantially all of the debtor's assets and the debtor will
no longer engage in business.8
Once confirmed, the plan is entitled to res judicata effect.0 The
bankruptcy court may not revoke the order confirming the plan un-
less the court, upon the request of a party in interest made within 180
days after confirmation, finds that the order was procured by fraud86
Appellate review is obtainable, but only if a timely appeal is filed
within ten days after entry of the confirmation order 7 and the appeal
has not become moot as a result of consummation of the confirmed
plan.e Thus, the broad discharge of claims and finality of the confir-
mation order make Chapter 11 an attractive vehicle for a company
seeking a lasting and global peace with its creditors. As will be dis-
cussed below, the effect of the debtor's discharge with respect to fu-
ture claims based on the debtor's prebankruptcy or preconfirmation
conduct depends on the court's construction of the definition of
"claim" and its determination as to when such a claim arises.
J. The Bankruptcy Code's Tlxibility in Providing
Creative Ways to Treat Claims
The Bankruptcy Code leaves room for creative flexibility in the
treatment of claims under a Chapter 11 plan. In particular, § 1123(b)
lists discretionary provisions that may be included in a plan, including
"any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable
plan. See i&
See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (3) (setting forth this discharge exception).
8See, e.g., Trulis v. Barton, 107 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Once a bankruptcy
plan is confirmed, it is binding on all parties and all questions that could have been
raised pertaining to the plan are entitled to resjudicata effect."); Monarch Life Ins. Co.
v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding thatresjudicata precluded
challenge to injunctions entered as part of a plan confirmation order).
6See 11 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994) (establishing the conditions for revocation).
7See FED. R. BANK. P. 8002(a) (describing the 10-day provision). If the plan is
confirmed by a district judge, rather than a bankruptcy judge, an appeal is timely if a
notice of appeal is filed within 30 days after entry of the order. See FED. R. APP. P.
4(a) (1), 6(a) (noting that appeals from the district court are governed by the 30-day
period).
sFor a case illustrating the broad scope of the mootness doctrine as applied to the
consummation of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, see In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d
553 (3d Cir. 1996). See also Kuntz v. Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul (In re Grand Union
Co.), 200 B.R. 101, 105 (D. Del. 1996) (identifying five factors to be considered when
applying the doctrine of equitable mootness).
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provisions of this title."' 9 The Code also has its own all writs provision,
which gives the court the power to issue "any order, process, or judg-
ment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this title."0 This flexibility has been used effectively in mass tort cases
to create trusts for the benefit of tort victims and to impose injunc-
tions to channel those victims to the trust and away from the reorgan-
ized company.9' The Code's flexibility is especially appropriate for
complex mass tort cases that present unique problems inviting crea-
tive solutions.
II. SEVEN STEPS FOR IMPROVING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
To BETTER DEAL wrm MASS TORT CLAIMS
Despite the many features that make the bankruptcy system an at-
tractive vehicle for dealing effectively with mass tort liability, the sys-
tem has several shortcomings that can and should be cured by legisla-
tive amendments.
92
A. Clarify the Definition of "Claim" To Include the Right
to Compensation for UnmanifestedInjuries
As discussed above, there is great significance in determining
whether an obligation is a "claim" under the Bankruptcy Code and
when that claim first arises. In general, only "claims" that arise before
the order for relief in a Chapter 7 case, or that arise before a Chapter
11 plan is confirmed, are discharged in bankruptcy.93 The automatic
stay against the commencement or continuation of actions against the
debtor in a nonbankruptcy forum does not apply unless the claimant
has a "claim" that arose before the bankruptcy petition is filed.9 In
addition, certain rights to participate in the bankruptcy case, such as
the right to file a proof of claim or to vote as a creditor on a Chapter
89 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b) (6) (1994).
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
9' See Kane v.Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 648-50 (2d Cir. 1988) (requiring
a plaintiff to adhere to a trust settlement plan arising out of asbestos claims).
If these recommendations are adopted by Congress, § 524(g), (h), which were
added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1994 to govern the treatment of asbestos-related
claims, should be repealed as unnecessary and too limiting. For an analysis of the 1994
asbestos-related provisions of the Code, see Mabey & Zisser, supra note 7.
93 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 1141(d) (1994) (describing the scope of these dis-
charges).
9' See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1994) (describing the scope of the automatic stay).
2000] ENTERPRISE-THREATENING MASS TORT LIABIL1TY
11 plan, are reserved only for the holders of prebankruptcy claims.9 5
If a claim arises after the bankruptcy case commences, but before a
Chapter 11 plan is confirmed or a Chapter 7 liquidation case is com-
pleted, the claim may be an administrative expense entitled to priority
in distribution.5
To provide the most effective relief for the debtor and the widest
participation from affected parties, Congress defined "claim" as
broadly as possible.9 ' Under § 101 (5) of the Bankruptcy Code, "claim"
is defined to include unmatured, contingent, and unliquidated obli-
gations, as well as matured and fixed obligations. In general, whether
or not it is too premature for a state court to recognize an unmatured
or contingent right to payment as a cause of action, the Bankruptcy
Code recognizes it as a "claim" for bankruptcy purposes. Despite the
Bankruptcy Code's broad definition of "claim," courts have not agreed
on how to apply this definition to mass tort cases involving unmani-
fested personal injuries. The inconsistency among federal courts and
the uncertainty this has caused has created enormous litigation costs
and delays. Those courts that have adopted a restrictive view leave re-
organized companies vulnerable to future tort litigation and to une-
qual treatment of victims of the same tortious conduct. The inequal-
ity is caused by making distributions to, and discharging the claims of,
present tort claimants with manifested injuries, while leaving those
with unmanifested injuries to fend for themselves many years after the
reorganized debtor emerges from bankruptcy and has either failed or
succeeded in its postbankruptcy business. As noted by the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission, "[b]ecause courts have reached dif-
ferent interpretations of when a claim has arisen and thus can be dealt
with in the bankruptcy case, debtors and plan proponents have been
afforded vastly different degrees of latitude in bringing mass future
claims into the bankruptcy process.9
95 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 1126(a) (1994) (describing who may file a proof of claim or
vote on a plan).
'6 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503, 507(a) (1994) (describing the allowance of administrative
expenses and priority in distribution).
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, when discussing the definition of
"claim," refers to it as the "broadest possible definition" intended to assure that "all
legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be
dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bank-
ruptcy court." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 309 (1978).
"But see F. Frenville v. M. Frenville Co. (In reM. Frenville Co.) 744 F.2d 332, 336-
38 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a claim must be "ripe" to sustain a cause of action). See
infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit's holding).
99 NBRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 323.
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It is beyond dispute that tort victims whose injuries have been
manifested before a bankruptcy petition is filed, thereby giving them
causes of action under state law, have prebankruptcy claims.0 0 It also
is clear that when the debtor's conduct giving rise to a tort claim oc-
curs entirely after a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed or, in a Chapter 7
case, after the order for relief, the resulting claim may not be im-
paired or discharged in the bankruptcy case.' Courts, however, have
used several different tests to determine when a claim arises for bank-
ruptcy purposes where the tortious conduct occurred before, but the
resulting injuries are first manifested after, the order for relief in a
Chapter 7 case or the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.1°2
1. Standards Used by Courts
a. The "Conduct Test"
The broadest test for determining when a claim arises is the "con-
duct test," which recognizes that a "claim" arises for bankruptcy pur-
poses when the debtor's tortious conduct occurs, whether or not an
injury is manifested at that time.us For example, if a company manu-
factures a defective product, sells it on the market to thousands of
consumers, and subsequently files a bankruptcy petition, the conduct
test dictates that all claims for injuries caused by the defective product
that are first manifested in the postbankruptcy future would be
"0 See Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 941 (3d Cir. 1985) ("It
is undisputed that a cause of action in tort is a 'claim' pursuant to section 77 [of the
Bankruptcy Act] so that if plaintiffs had causes of action that existed... prior to the
relevant consummation dates they had 'claims.'"); Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In
re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 922 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) ("Certainly
claims arising from injuries that manifest themselves anytime before confirmation
come within the scope of the definition [of 'claim'], even if both liability and damages
are both contested and unresolved."), vacated, 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr.W.D. Tex. 1998).
'0' See Kresmery v. Service Am. Corp., 227 B.R. 10, 15 (D. Conn. 1998) ("As a gen-
eral rule, a successfully reorganized debtor under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
is liable for any independent conduct or claims which arose after confirmation of its
bankruptcy plan.").
"2 At least one court, while approving a plan to set aside funds for future tort
claimants, avoided the issue whether future claimants have "claims" by permitting
them to participate in the case as "parties in interest." See In reJohns-Manville Corp.,
36 B.R. 743, 745-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that future claimants were parties
in interestwith the right to appear and be heard in the Chapter 11 case and, therefore,
they were entitled to have a representative), affd, 52 B.R. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
103 See, e.g., Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that
claims arise based on the time when acts allegedly giving rise to liability were per-
formed).
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treated as prebankruptcy claims and discharged in the bankruptcy
case. This test is consistent with the expansive definition of "claim" in
the Bankruptcy Code and the policy of affording the broadest relief in
a bankruptcy case.
The conduct test has been criticized, however, as being over-
broad.10 Claimants who did not use or have any exposure to the dan-
gerous product until long after the bankruptcy case has concluded
would nonetheless be subject to the terms of a preexisting confirmed
Chapter 11 plan. These claimants may be unidentifiable because of
their lack of contact with the debtor or the product and, accordingly,
may not have had the benefit of notice and an opportunity to partici-
pate in the bankruptcy case. Others have responded to these fairness
and due process concerns by relying on the appointment of a legal
representative to represent the interests of the unidentified future
claimants.
105
b. The "Relationship Test"
Concerns that the conduct test may be too broad have led other
courts to adopt a "relationship test."' °6 That is, a claim first arises for
bankruptcy purposes when the debtor engaged in the conduct giving
rise to liability and there is contact, privity of contract, or another rela-
tionship between the claimant and the debtor. If the debtor's alleged
wrongful acts were committed, and the claimant and the debtor had
some relationship before confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, the right
to payment upon the future manifestation of injury would be a dis-
charged debt. If the victim's relationship with the debtor or his or her
exposure to the defective product occurred after confirmation of the
Chapter 11 plan, however, the future claimant would not have had a
"claim" in the bankruptcy case, and accordingly, would be unaffected
by the bankruptcy discharge.
The following illustration demonstrates how the relationship test
104 See, e.g., Houser, supra note 7, at 464 (arguing that "[cilaimants who have had
no pre-petition exposure to the debtor's products... would be subject to discharge
before their injury occurs").
'05 See Heidt, Products Liability, supra note 7, at 144 (arguing that "[r]epresentation
and a trust mechanism are the keys to satisfying due process concerns").
"6 See, eg., Epstein v. Official Comm'n of Unsecured Creditors (In rePiper Aircraft
Corp.), 58 F.3d 1578, 1577-78 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a "claim" requires both
conduct giving rise to liability and a relationship between the debtor and the claim-
ant); United States v. LTV Corp. (In reChateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1006-08 (2d
Cir. 1991) (endeavoring to apply the definition of "claim" as written while being mind-
fil of the purposes of bankruptcy law and discussing injunctive remedies as claims).
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could result in questionable discrimination against future claimants.
Suppose a single-engine airplane was sold to a pilot in 1998 for recrea-
tional use and the seller manufacturer subsequently filed a Chapter 11
petition because of an onslaught of personal injury and wrongful
death lawsuits alleging product defects. If a Chapter 11 plan is con-
firmed in 1999, and the airplane crashes in 2002 while the pilot is giv-
ing her neighbor his first airplane ride, the pilot's right to damages
for personal injury based on an alleged product defect would be a dis-
chargeable claim because of the pilot's preconfirmation contractual
relationship with the debtor. Yet, the neighbor's right to damages for
personal injury would not be affected by the bankruptcy and could be
asserted against the reorganized company because of the absence of
any preconfirmation relationship between the debtor and the neigh-
bor.
c. Fair Contemplation Test
Several courts have adopted the "fair contemplation test" to de-
termine when a future claim arises. Under this test, a claim does not
arise for bankruptcy purposes until the debtor's tortious conduct oc-
curs and the potential existence of the claim could have been rea-
sonably contemplated by the parties."7 Thus, an unknown claim that
could not have been reasonably contemplated before bankruptcy is
not a prebankruptcy "claim," even if the conduct giving rise to the
claim took place before the bankruptcy petition was filed.
d. Accrued State Law Cause of Action Test
In In re M. Frenville Co., the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
surprised the bankruptcy world by holding that a claim does not arise
for bankruptcy purposes until it ripens into a cause of action under
nonbankruptcy law.0 8 The court held that the automatic stay did not
'07 See, eg., California Dept. of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In reJensen), 995 F.2d 925,
930 (9th Cir. 1993) (indicating that at least in cases involving alleged violations of envi-
ronmental statutes, a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes when the claimant has a fair
basis for contemplating that it might have a claim against the debtor). The court of
appeals in Jensen quoted a commentator's criticism that "nothing in the legislative his-
tory or the Code suggests that Congress intended to discharge a creditor's rights be-
fore the creditor knew or should have known that its rights existed." Id. (quoting
KevinJ. Saville, Note, Discharging CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy, 76 MINN. L. REV. 327,
349 (1991)). See also Hexcel Corp. v. Stepan Co. (In re Hexcel Corp.), 239 B.R. 564, 567-72
(N.D. Cal. 1999), in which the district court applied the "fair contemplation test" and
held that the applicability of that test is not limited to environmental claims.
108 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). The Third Circuit reaffirmed its holding in
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preclude a creditor from taking action on an indemnity claim against
the debtor because the indemnity claim had not become a cause of
action under state law, despite the fact that the debtor's alleged
wrongful act took place before bankruptcy. This holding ignores the
Bankruptcy Code's definition of "claim," which includes contingent
and unmatured rights to payment, and has been heavily criticized by
other courts and commentators.1' If applied in a mass tort case, the
Third Circuit approach would preclude a tort victim from having a
dischargeable claim under the Bankruptcy Code, unless, either pre-
petition in a Chapter 7 case or preconfirmation in a Chapter 11 case,
the victim had a cause of action that could have been pursued in liti-
gation under state law.
2. The 1994 Asbestos Amendments Added to the Confusion
As part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Congress amended
the Bankruptcy Code to add the so-called "asbestos amendments."110
These amendments added detailed provisions to § 524 for the pur-
pose of confirming the legality and enforceability of the trust mecha-
nisms set up in the Johns-Manville, UAR and other asbestos-related
Chapter 11 cases in the 1980s to benefit asbestos victims, while pro-
tecting debtor manufacturers from future liability. The amendments
also confirm the enforceability of channeling injunctions that enjoin
asbestos-related claimants from pursuing the reorganized debtor,
thereby forcing them to seek recourse only against the trust. m
The 1994 amendments refer to future rights to compensation for
asbestos-related injuries as future "demands," rather than "claims." As
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission has noted, this distinc-
tion
calls into question the applicability of other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code to the holders of these future demands. Although the asbestos
amendments spell out different procedures for asbestos demand hold-
Frenvile in In re Penn Central Transportation Co., 71 F.8d 1113, 1117-18 (3d Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 (1996).
'09 See, eg., Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1988) (declining
to follow Frenville's limiting definitions of "claim"); Kenneth N. Klee & Frank A.
Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight Years ofJudicial Legislation, 62 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 1, 28-29 (1988) (noting that "[b]y far the most frequently cited and criticized case
is [Frenvi!e]").
,,0 Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
.. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g), (h) (1994) (detailing requirements for issuance of in-
junctions and procedures that apply to existing injunctions relating to asbestos-related
liability).
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ers, depriving demand holders of "claim" status in the bankruptcy proc-
ess strips parties with asbestos injuries of the other protections of the
Bankruptcy Code, and thus, in a sense, provides them with inferior
treatment in the course of the case but discharges their claims as if they
were claimholders."2
This treatment of asbestos-related injuries as dischargeable "de-
mands" adds to the confusion over whether a future claimant's right
to compensation is a "claim" under the Bankruptcy Code, especially in
113non-asbestos mass tort cases.
3. Proposing a Modified "Conduct Test" for Determining
When a Mass Tort Claim Arises
The key to employing the bankruptcy system to effectively and fi-
nally resolve mass tort liability so as to preserve the going concern
value of the company, while providing fair and equal treatment for all
present and future tort victims, is to recognize as a "claim" under the
Bankruptcy Code a right to compensation for unmanifested injuries-
whether or not state law would treat it as creating a cause of action
and regardless of whether the victim has had any prebankruptcy or
preconfirmation relationship to the debtor or the product. It is im-
portant to recognize that such a claim arises as soon as the debtor has
engaged in conduct that is or will become the basis for liability. This
is the purest statement of the "conduct test" now applied by some
courts. The more restrictive "relationship" or "state law cause of ac-
tion" tests would have the undesirable effect of leaving some tort
claims out of the bankruptcy system while treating and discharging
others, although the cause of all injuries was the same or similar pre-
bankruptcy or preconfirmation conduct.
Despite the attractiveness of the conduct test, however, due proc-
ess and fairness concerns have caused some to recommend the addi-
tion of certain gatekeepers to that test when applied to future mass
tort victims. These gatekeepers are designed to prevent a company
from using bankruptcy as a way to insulate itself from any possible fu-
ture liability for its past acts when such future liability is not presently
112 NBRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 321.
" In an uncodified provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Congress
clarified that the asbestos amendments should not be construed to preclude or affect a
bankruptcy court's power to deal with non-asbestos mass tort cases. See Pub. L. No.
103-394, § 111(b), 108 Stat. 4106, 4117 ("Nothing . . . shall be construed to modify,
impair, or supersede any other authority the court has to issue injunctions in connec-
tion with an order confirming a plan of reorganization.").
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a real threat and is much too speculative and incapable of estimation.
For example, suppose a pharmaceutical company were to file a Chap-
ter 11 petition only because its declining profits have caused it to de-
fault on bank loans and bonds. The company has suffered because of
increased competition in the market, not because it has been the tar-
get of product liability claims. In fact, it has never been sued for
products liability and has no reason to believe that any of its products
are defective or will cause any personal injuries. Nonetheless, as a
precaution, its lawyer suggests that the company provides in its Chap-
ter 11 plan for the creation of a trust sufficiently funded to cover pos-
sible future claims that may arise from putting pharmaceutical prod-
ucts on the market, for a legal representative to act on behalf of future
claimants, and for the discharge of any future claims. How much
should be set aside in the trust for future claimants? The speculative
nature of future liability based on prebankruptcy acts would make es-
timation a silly exercise. In that situation, future claimants should not
be dealt with or discharged in the Chapter 11 case.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has recommended
that a definition of "mass future claim" be added as a subset of the
definition of "claim" in § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code. 14 A claim
based on the debtor's acts or omissions would give rise to such a
claim, whether or not it has ripened into a cause of action under state
law, if such acts or omissions may be sufficient to establish liability
when injuries ultimately are manifested."5 This is the adoption of the
conduct test. The Commission, however, also suggested three gate-
keeping requlrements. First, at the time of the petition, the debtor
'" See NBRO REPORT, supra note 10, at 322 (articulating a proposed definition of
"mass tort claim"). For a Commissioner's dissenting views and harsh criticism of the
NBRO's proposed definition of "claim" as creating additional uncertainty, see Jones,
supra note 7, at 1707-09. See also Thomas E. Willging, Mass Torts Problems & Proposals:
A Report to the Mass Torts Working Group, in REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra
note 12, app. C at 70-80, for a discussion ofJudgeJones's views on the NBRO's propos-
als defining future claims.
i By recommending a definition that requires that the debtor's acts or omissions
"may be sufficient to establish liability," the NBRO recognized the importance of pro-
viding access to bankruptcy to deal with mass tort claims without the need to admit
liability. NBRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 326.
116 See id. at 327-29 (describing the threshold restrictions imposed by the "mass fu-
ture claim" definition). The National Bankruptcy Conference has instead recom-
mended that the definition of "claim" be amended to add a definition of "future
claim," which may arise regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued under state
law or whether the identity of the claimant is known. Under the NBC recommenda-
tion, a "future claim" is created by one or more acts of the debtor if. (1) the act or acts
on which liability would be imposed occurred before or at the time of the order for
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must have been subject to numerous demands for payment for inju-
ries or damages arising from the debtor's conduct,"7 and is likely to be
subject to substantial future demands on similar grounds. Second, fu-
ture claimants must be known or, if unknown, they must be identifi-
able or described with reasonable certainty. Third, the amount of li-
ability must be reasonably capable of estimation.""
An appropriate balance between the reorganization needs of the
company and the desire to provide sufficient resources to compensate
future claimants fairly could be achieved by the adoption of the NBRC
proposals regarding future claims, but with two modest alterations.
These alterations would avoid the risk that the gatekeeping require-
ments would be applied in a manner that would be too limiting. First,
the requirement that unknown future claimants must be identifiable
relief in the bankruptcy case, (2) such acts are sufficient to establish liability when inju-
ries are ultimately manifested, (3) the acts upon which the claim is based and the cate-
gory of entities which may be holders of future claims have been identified with rea-
sonable certainty, and (4) the claim or class of claims is reasonably capable of
estimation or no harm results to claimants from a failure to estimate. See NBC CODE
REVIEW PROJECT REPORT, supra note 8, at 35-37 (proposing definition of future claim).
17 The NBRC proposal recognizes the benefits of what the Mass Tort Working
Group calls the "maturation process." REPORT ON MASS TORT LIGATION, supra note
12, at 22-27. As mass tort cases based on similar acts are litigated or settled individually
or in small groups, relevant scientific knowledge develops, liability and damage issues
are resolved in some tribunals, and experience begins to help predict or assess the
value of claims.
[T]he maturation process is often crucial to determining the consequences of
mass tort litigation. Many years may be required to develop reliable scientific
information to answer the questions raised by exposure to a product or sub-
stance. Premature judicial attempts to determine whether injuries are caused
by a product or substance can be so unreliable that the nature of the litigation
is distorted dramatically.
Id. at 25.
n1 The requirement that mass tort liability be capable of reasonable estimation
protects parties in at least three ways. First, a reasonable estimation is needed to pro-
vide adequate information for a legal representative of future claimants, as well as
other unsecured creditors and equity holders, to vote on a Chapter 11 plan intelli-
gently. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994) (requiring that a written disclosure statement con-
taining adequate information be transmitted to claimants before soliciting their accep-
tances or rejections of a plan). Second, in a cramdown situation in which the legal
representative votes to reject a plan, an estimation will assure that the fair and equita-
ble requirements for confirmation are met by funding a trust with sufficient assets. See
id. § 1129(b) (allowing a reorganization plan to be confirmed despite rejection by a
class of creditors if the court finds the plan fair and equitable with respect to that
class). Third, estimation enables the plan proponent to provide the same or similar
treatment, on a pro rata basis, to other classes of unsecured claims, such as bondhold-
ers or trade creditors. See id. § 1123 (a) (4) (requiring the same treatment under a plan
for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the claim holder agrees to less
favorable treatment).
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or described with reasonable certainty should be either eliminated or
clarified so that it will be broadly construed. If the other require-
ments for the definition of "mass future claim"--the experience of
numerous demands and a determination that future claims can be
reasonably estimated-are met, and a legal representative is ap-
pointed to act on behalf of future claimants, that future claimants are
not identifiable or described with reasonable certainty at the time of
bankruptcy should not be of crucial importance. If this requirement is
included in the definition of "mass future claim," then the definition
should clarify that a general description of the category of claimants,
such as "all persons injured" by a particular medicine, is sufficient to
satisfy this requirement.
The second modest alteration that should be made to the NBRC
definition of "mass future claim" relates to the requirement that liabil-
ity be reasonably capable of estimation. If courts construe the estima-
tion requirement so as to require too much precision in the calcula-
tions, few mass tort liability cases would pass the test. The Bankruptcy
Code should clarify that future claims are reasonably capable of esti-
mation if there is a rational basis for arriving at an estimation. If the
court can approximate a range of liability exposure, the court should
do its best to refine that range to an estimate for bankruptcy pur-
poses."9 Future claims should be excluded from the bankruptcy pro-
cess only if they are so speculative or unforeseeable that there is no
rational basis for putting an appropriate dollar amount on eventual
liability.
It is important to note that if future mass tort liability is so prema-
ture and speculative that there is no rational basis for estimation, the
NBRC proposal would not close the door on the use of bankruptcy to
deal with eventual liability. Rather, the company's use of bankruptcy
for this purpose would be delayed until there will have been sufficient
experience in litigating or settling claims so as to create a basis for
reasonable estimation.
"9 The concept of compelling a bankruptcy court to approximate liability is not
novel; the Bankruptcy Code now mandates that bankruptcy courts estimate unliqui-
dated and contingent claims if fixing them would unduly delay the administration of
the estate. See U § 502(c) (providing that "[t]here shall be estimated for purposes of
allowance ... any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of
which... would unduly delay the administration of the case" (emphasis added)).
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B. Provide for the Appointment of a Legal Representative
of Future Mass Tort Claimants
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly provide for it,
bankruptcy courts have appointed legal representatives for future
claimants in mass tort cases.120 The Code should be amended to pro-
vide that, unless demonstrated early in the case that future claims will
remain unimpaired under a Chapter 11 plan, the bankruptcy court
must order the appointment of a legal representative to represent the
class of future mass tort claimants in every bankruptcy case involving
future mass tort liability '22 Upon ordering the appointment, the
United States trustee should be required to appoint, subject to court
approval, a legal representative with powers to investigate, negotiate,
file a proof of claim, vote on a Chapter 11 plan, and raise and be
heard on any issue on behalf of a class of future mass tort claimants.'t s
These powers would enable future claimants to take advantage of the
protections afforded by Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, including
the right to receive at least as much value as they would receive in a
Chapter 7 liquidation case, the absolute priority rule, the protection
against unfair discrimination, and a court determination on feasibility
of the plan.' The representative would be a fiduciary for the class he
or she represents.
The legal representative should be required to make the same
kind of disclosure regarding possible conflicts of interest as is required
"2 See, e.g., In reAmatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1044 (3d Cir. 1985) (directing bank-
ruptcy court to appoint a legal representative for future claimants); In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 757-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (sustaining motion to ap-
point guardian for unknown claimants), affd, 52 B.R. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
1 For a definition of the impairment of claims, see 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994).
' The National Bankruptcy Conference and the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission also have called for statutory changes that specifically authorize bank-
ruptcy courts to appoint legal representatives for future claimants in mass tort cases.
See NBC CODE REVIEW PROJECT REPORT, supra note 8, at 87-38; NBRC REPORT, supra
note 10, at 329-30.
3 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has recommended that a legal
representative for the holders of future mass tort claims have the same powers as a
creditors' committee under § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code. The NBRC also recom-
mended that the representative have the power to file a proof of claim on behalf of
future claimants, but that identifiable future claimants should have the right to file and
vote their own claims. Although the NBRC would allow such claimants to opt out of
having the legal representative represent their interests, they would not be permitted
to opt out of the class or the plan in the way that a class member may opt out of a Rule
23 class action. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 330.
..4 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (a)(11), (b)(1) (1994) (stating some of the re-
quirements for confirmation of a plan).
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for a professional to be employed by a trustee or debtor in posses-
sion.'  The representative also should have the authority, with court
approval, to employ attorneys, accountants, or other professionals as
126appropriate to effectively represent the class, and all reasonable ex-
penses incurred by the representative should be paid by the bank-
ruptcy estate as administrative expenses.27
The appointment of a legal representative should alleviate fairness
and procedural due process concerns. In Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., a landmark due process decision, the Supreme
Court held that procedural due process requires notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard before a court may deprive a person of a property
interest3 8 The Court, however, also recognized that constructive no-
tice, such as notice by publication, may be sufficient if it is "all that the
situation permits" when giving notice to unknown trust beneficiar-
ies.1' The best practical way to give notice to future mass tort claim-
ants in many cases is by press releases, notices mailed to targeted
groups of product users or others likely to have been exposed, and
newspaper and other media advertisements.
Notwithstanding Mullane, however, the adequacy of these forms of
notice alone in mass tort cases has been called into question by the
Supreme Court. In Amchem, the Supreme Court avoided addressing
the adequacy of notice in a mass tort class action case involving future
claimants, but recognized "the gravity of the question whether class
action notice sufficient under the Constitution... could ever be given
to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous."'
Commentators have suggested that procedural due process re-
quirements could be satisfied by the appointment of a legal represen-
tative to act on behalf of future tort claimants "together with the best
practicable notice" under the circumstances. 3' Some have gone fur-
"' See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a) (requiring that in an application for employment,
the professional hired must state "to the best of the applicant's knowledge, all of the
person's connections").
126 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 327, 1103(a) (1994), for similar powers of a trustee or credi-
tors' committee.
'2 See id. §§ 503(b), 507(1) (permitting allowance for administrative expenses and
granting such expenses priority).
1 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
"2 1d. at 317.
'" Amchema Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
... NBC CODE REVMVPROJECr REPORT, supra note 8, at 38. The NBC Code Review
Project Report suggested:
Where feasible notice to future claimants is inadequate standing alone, such
as where individual claimants are not identifiable and injury has not yet mani-
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ther in suggesting that the appointment of a legal representative in
mass tort cases is necessary to satisfy procedural due process require-
ments15 2
Among the essential characteristics of a legal representative acting
on behalf of future mass tort claimants are independence and a lack
of conflicts of interest.' As discussed above, the legal representative
should be selected by the United States trustee with court approval,
rather than by the debtor, parties in interest, or attorneys purporting
to represent future claimants when the bankruptcy petition is filed.
Caution should be exercised to assure that shortcuts are not taken
regarding the selection of the legal representative. For this reason,
courts should be extremely reluctant to permit a proposed settlement
of future claims-negotiated with a legal representative selected by
the parties before bankruptcy-to be presented to the court for con-
firmation in a "prepackaged" Chapter 11 plan.'34 In such cases, any
fested, and where such notice is constitutionally required, the court may find
that the appointment of a legal representative for future claims, together with
the best practicable notice, satisfies the requirements of due process. Such a
finding may be appropriate when the outlines of risk and injury to a group of
future claimants is discernable such that their representative can present
credible evidence respecting appropriate treatment for the group.
Id.; see also Heidt, Future Claims, supra note 7, at 515 (asserting that "due process prob-
lems resulting from insufficient notice or knowledge can be addressed by appointing a
representative for the future claimants and establishing a fund to pay the claimants as
their claims become fixed").
112 Ralph R. Mabey andjamie Andra Gavrin advocate this view.
When the debtor possesses general knowledge about a group of likely future
claims-especially when future claimants may not even be aware of their ex-
posure to an offending product-publication notice by itself does not suffice.
Rather, the practical situation in a bankruptcy case usually also permits (and
therefore Mullane usually mandates) the appointment of a future claims rep-
resentative in order to provide future claims access to a court hearing.... The
practicality mandate of Mullane therefore usually requires the opportunity for
future claimants to be heard through a representative when publication no-
tice to them is largely futile.
Mabey & Gavrin, supra note 7, at 780-81.
"ss Any doubts as to the importance of these attributes were put to rest by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2380
(1999), where the Court set aside a class action settlement because, among other rea-
sons, some of the attorneys who served as counsel for the class of future claimants had
a conflict of interest arising from their representation of present claimants in the set-
tlement.
"4 The Bankruptcy Code recognizes that a debtor may negotiate and formulate a
proposed Chapter 11 plan, distribute it with appropriate disclosure documents, and
solicit'votes before the bankruptcy case is commenced. The votes obtained from credi-
tors and equity holders before bankruptcy will count in the bankruptcy case. See 11
U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1994) (holding claimants and interest-holders to their pre-case ac-
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votes to accept the plan cast by the prebankruptcy legal representative
should not count. A new, independent legal representative appointed
after the filing of the bankruptcy case, with sufficient time to review
any proposed estimation or settlement and an opportunity to vote on
the proposed plan on behalf of future claimants, should be required.
C. Provide for Present-Value Estimation of Future Mass Tort Claims
forAllowance and Distribution Purposes
Probably the most difficult challenge facing courts presiding over
mass tort cases involving long-tail future claims is a determination or
estimation of the aggregate amount of such claims. The difficulty of
estimating future claims is the same in a nonbankruptcy proceeding,
such as a class action, as it is in a bankruptcy case. Estimating future
claims is especially complex when underlying liability, in addition to
the magnitude of harm, is disputed.
3 5
Skeptics invariably cite the Johns-Manvill s6 case to demonstrate
the futility in attempting to accurately estimate future claims. In that
case, the trust established to fund payments to claimants fell short of
its goal of preserving assets necessary to provide compensation for
claimants who would first manifest an asbestos-related disease in the
future. As a result, the trust had to receive an increase in funding sev-
eral years after its creation.3 7 Johns-Manville, however, was one of the
ceptances or rejections of a plan). This procedure reduces the time during which the
debtor is in Chapter 11. When acceptances are obtained before bankruptcy, the case is
commonly called a "prepackaged" Chapter 11 case.
Prepackaged Chapter 11 plans are common in commercial cases, such as where a
company needs to restructure a bond issuance, but are rare in mass tort cases. In re
Fuller-Austin Insulation Co., No. 98-2038-JJF, 1998 WL 812388 (D. Del. Nov. 10, 1998),
was the first prepackaged mass tort Chapter 11 case. For a discussion and criticism of
the case, see Rice & Davis, supra note 14, at 448-51. Rice and Davis comment that the
professor selected by the debtor in Fuller-Austin to act as a legal representative in pre-
bankruptcy negotiations on behalf of unknown asbestos-related future claimants was
approved by the court "without extensive scrutiny," as part of the prepackaged plan.
I& at 450. For a general discussion of prepackaged plans, see Leonard P. Goldberger,
The Mass Tort Pre-Pack" What Wil They Think of Next ?, 17 AM.BANML INsT.J. 18 (1999).
Although prepackaged Chapter 11 plans are rare in mass tort cases, the Judicial
Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and Working Group on Mass Torts
has noted their emergence and has reported that they warrant consideration. "This
procedure could achieve the same effects as a mandatory, no-opt-out settlement class."
REPORT ON MASS TORT LIGATION, supra note 12, at 59.
'" See, e.g., In reDow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (illus-
trating the difficulty of estimating future claims when liability is disputed).
'- MacArthur Co. v.Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988).
"3 See In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 755-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (explain-
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earliest mass tort cases. 'ss As the National Bankruptcy Review Com-
mission found, courts have learned valuable lessons from the Johns-
Manville experience and have improved the ability to adequately esti-
mate future claims liability in the aggregate." A leading example of a
reasonably accurate estimation of future claims is the A.H. Robins case
where, after a six-day estimation hearing, the trust established for the
benefit of personal injury claimants was funded in an amount that ex-.... 140
ceeded original projections.
Once estimation occurs in a Chapter 11 case, the amount esti-
mated may be used for voting and disclosure purposes and to deter-
mine whether a plan of reorganization meets the confirmation re-
quirement of feasibility."' It is unclear, however, whether bankruptcy
courts have the power to estimate claims for the purpose of placing a
cap on aggregate future distributions.14
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission and the National
Bankruptcy Conference have recommended that the Bankruptcy
Code be amended to provide expressly that the bankruptcy court may
ing how in 1989, as a result of a cash shortage in the trust, Manville Corp. prepaid a
$50 million note payable to the trust in installments in 1990 and 1991), vacated, 982
F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
"s See Mabey & Zisser, supra note 7, at 495-96 (describing procedural problems in
Johns-Manville that resulted in certain advantages to claimants who litigated against the
trust); see alsoJACK B. WEINsTEIN, INDIVIDUALJuSTIcE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: T1E
EFFEcT OF CLAss ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTrPARTY DEVICES 57, 106
(1995), cited in NBRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 344 n.857 (discussing huge plaintiffs'
attorneys fees that plagued the Johns-ManvillVe case despite failed efforts to control
them).
9 See NBRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 344 (discussing the progress of courts with
respect to claims estimation since Johns-Manville).
140 See In reA.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 699 (4th Cir. 1989) (describing the es-
timation hearing); Mabey & Zisser, supra note 7, at 497 n.45 (discussing the admini-
stration of the A.H. Robins plan); NBRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 344 (noting the suc-
cess of the A.H. Robins trust); Vairo, supra note 32 (providing a history of the A.H.
Robins plan and the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust it created). But see Willging, supra
note 114, at 76-78, for a critical discussion of the estimation process inA.H. Robins.
14 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1126(a), 1129(a)(11) (1994) (governing disclosure, vot-
ing, and feasibility requirements for plan confirmation).
142 See, e.g., In reMCorp. Fin., Inc., 137B.R. 219, 226 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (hold-
ing that estimation of claims does not limit distributions); In re Poole Funeral Chapel,
Inc., 63 B.R. 527, 532 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986) (holding that estimation does dictate
distribution); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 57 B.R. 751, 758 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (holding
that estimation establishes a cap, but not a floor, on distribution); see also Sheldon S.
Toll, Bankruptcy and Mass Torts: The Commission's Proposal 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
363, 373 (1997) ("One of the hot topics of current bankruptcy law in the mass tort area
is whether estimation can only be used for determining feasibility of a plan of reor-
ganization, or whether it can also be used for determining distribution, thus capping
future mass tort claims.").
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estimate the aggregate amount of future claims in mass tort cases for
the purpose of distribution, as well as for allowance.'4 These recom-
mendations are sound. If the estimated amounts of aggregate future
claims become binding for distribution purposes-so that estimation
effectively means determination-there would be greater certainty, an
enhanced ability to provide adequate funding for the trust, and final-
ity in the treatment of future claims. The estimation would limit the
aggregate amount of distributions that will ultimately be made and
may be used in determining how large the trust should be. The esti-
mation also would be relied upon for confirmation purposes, includ-
ing the determination whether the plan satisfies the "best interest of
creditors" standard and "fair and equitable" requirements.!"
Once aggregate future claims are estimated, it is necessary to de-
termine how the trust funds will be distributed to individual claimants.
Distribution mechanisms for individual claimants are often estab-
lished by plans of reorganization or trust documents in mass tort
Chapter 11 cases. Settlements and mediation mechanisms may be
used to determine the amount of an allowed claim for pro rata distri-
bution purposes. However, if an individual personal injury or wrong-
fal death tort claimant insists, Title 28 guarantees the right to a jury
trial in district court for the purpose of liquidating the claim.'4 Once
the amount of the claim is liquidated, the confirmed Chapter 11 plan
will determine how the claim will be treated and the amount to be dis-
tributed to the claimant.
The recommendation to give bankruptcy courts the power to es-
timate aggregate claims for distribution purposes should not be mis-
understood as a suggestion that bankruptcy judges are better than
state or other federal judges at achieving such estimations. Anyjudge,
143 See NBC CODE REVIEW PROJECT REPORT, supra note 8, at 39 ("Section 502(c)
should be amended to clarify that the estimation of all claims, including any claim filed
by a representative of future claims, may be made for purposes of distribution as well
as allowance and voting."); NBRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 341 ("Section 502 should
provide that the court may estimate mass future claims and also may determine the
amount of mass future claims prior to confirmation of a plan for purposes of distribu-
tion as well as allowance and voting.").
144 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7), (b) (codifying the "best interest" and "fair and equi-
table" requirements).
14 In 1984, Title 28 of the United States Code, which governs bankruptcy court
jurisdiction, was amended to provide that the "district court shall order that personal
injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the
bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in which the claim
arose." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (5) (1994). Tide 28 also preserves the right to trial byjury
"that an individual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a personal
injury or wrongful death tort claim." 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (1994).
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whether in the state or federal judiciary, would be faced with the same
difficult task of estimating future claims in a mass tort case, and there
is no reason to believe that a bankruptcy judge would be any better,
nor any worse, than otherjudges in making the determination.1
6
D. Expressly Authorize Channeling Injunctions
in Appropriate Cases
The key to a fair resolution of mass tort liability is the preservation
of assets for future claimants. An effective mechanism for achieving
this goal may be to set aside assets in trust for future claimants to be
funded, in whole or in part, by future income of the debtor company
or by proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets. It is not unusual
for the trust to hold stock in the debtor so that it would share in, or
receive all of, its profits. It also could hold proceeds of insurance
policies or settlement contributions made by the debtor's insurers.
Bankruptcy courts have issued so-called "channeling injunctions"
that direct claimants to pursue any remedies they may have against the
trust, while prohibiting actions against the debtor company or the
debtor's insurers that have funded the trust. 47 The protected com-
pany then feeds the trust with cash contributions through stock divi-
dends, insurance proceeds, or other cash contributions. This
mechanism is consistent with the discharge granted to the company
under the Bankruptcy Code.
Before 1994, bankruptcy courts issued channeling injunctions and
established trusts for mass tort claimants without express statutory
authority to do so."9 Courts relied on § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, a general provision that gives bankruptcy courts the power to
"issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]."'O The Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994 added a provision to the Bankruptcy Code
146 SeeJones, supra note 7, at 1716 (noting that "the process of estimating and pro-
viding for mass future claims in bankruptcy is no less challenging and settled than in
the class action context").
14 See, e.g., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1988)
(issuing a channeling injunction designed to prohibit claimants from commencing or
continuing litigation against the debtor's insurer where the insurer contributed funds
to a trust for future asbestos victims).
148 See, e.g., id. at 91.
"9 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 701-02 (4th Cir. 1989) (issuing a
channeling injunction without specific statutory authority);John-Manrille, 837 F.2d at
93-94 (same).
ISO 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
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that expressly provides for channeling injunctions, but only in asbes-
tos cases and only under limited circumstances.'5'
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has endorsed the
use of channeling injunctions in mass tort cases and has recom-
mended that the Bankruptcy Code be amended to expressly provide
for such use, regardless of whether the case is asbestos-related.
Authorizing channeling injunctions would ensure that the Bankruptcy
Code specifically empowers the court to use this valuable tool in appro-
priate cases to direct mass future claim holders to a reasonably funded
pool of resources. Any uncertainty about the effectiveness of a channel-
ing injunction would be eliminated, thus enhancing both the effective-
ness of the reorganization and the pool available to fund repayments to
victims.
52
Channeling injunctions may be necessary to protect the debtor
under present law because of uncertainties regarding the existence
and dischargeability of future mass tort claims. It could be argued
that a channeling injunction should no longer be necessary to protect
the debtor if the Bankruptcy Code is amended to clarify that mass fu-
ture claims are dischargeable. Nonetheless, a channeling injunction
could play an important role where appropriate to protect asset pur-
chasers, insurers, or other third parties'O who have contributed sub-
stantial assets to a global settlement. For these reasons, the Bank-
ruptcy Code should be amended to clarify that courts have the power
to issue channeling injunctions in all appropriate cases involving mass
tort liability.
E. Subordinate Punitive Damage Claims
The Bankruptcy Code should also be amended to provide that
punitive damage claims are subordinated to general unsecured claims
in mass tort cases.
.. See i § 524(g) (1) (B) (1994) (codifying the power to issue channeling injunc-
tions in asbestos cases).
' NBRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 346. The National Bankruptcy Conference
also suggested that the Bankruptcy Code be amended to clarify that channeling in-
junctions may be issued in appropriate cases. See NBC CODE REvIEW PROJECT REPORT,
supra note 8, at 41 ("Proposal D.8 is provided to make clear that a court can use the
mechanism ofchannelinginjunctions. ... ").
'" The use of channeling injunctions to protect third parties has received some
criticism. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 7, at 1717 (urging caution in the granting of
channeling injunctions); Wiliging, supra note 114, at 78-79 (notingJudge Jones's warn-
ings that the NBRC channeling injunction would protect third parties from future
claimants).
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The difficulties in estimating future claims and setting aside suffi-
cient assets to compensate all claimants in mass tort cases become
even more complex if the court allows holders of punitive damage
claims to share in the distribution of a debtor's assets on the same
level as holders of compensatory damage claims. Moreover, the risk
that a trust funded to compensate future claimants will fall short of its
goal-because of inaccuracies inherent in any estimation process-is
heightened if payments are made to earlier claimants for punitive
damages, thereby depleting funds otherwise available to claimants
whose injuries manifest later. For these reasons, the likelihood of suc-
cess in providing fair compensation for injuries in mass tort cases is
increased if punitive damage claims are either disallowed or subordi-
nated to general unsecured creditors.
The subordination provision should apply whether or not punitive
damages were awarded before the commencement of the bankruptcy
case. If pre-petitionjudgments for punitive damages would give a pre-
sent claimant an advantage over future claimants, the bankruptcy pol-
icy of equality of treatment of similar creditors would be frustrated.
The Bankruptcy Code is inconsistent with respect to its treatment
of punitive damage claims. In Chapter 7 liquidation cases, punitive
damage claims are subordinated to general unsecured claims.15 That
is, all general unsecured claims must be paid in full, excluding interest
that accrues during the case, before any creditor receives a distribu-
tion on a punitive damage claim. It is more important to compensate
all claimants for actual damages than it is to punish the debtor for
wrongful conduct. General subordination, however, does not occur
in Chapter 11 in a manner that assures that each creditor must be
compensated for actual damages in full before any distribution based
on punitive damages. 5
... See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (4) (1994) (listing payment of punitive damage claims af-
ter general unsecured claims for distribution purposes in a Chapter 7 case). Punitive
damage claims, however, are senior to claims for post-petition interest on unsecured
claims. See id. § 726(a) (4), (5) (ordering payment of interest on a claim fifth in pay-
ment priority in a Chapter 7 case while payment of punitive damages is fourth in pay-
ment priority).
IS' It could be argued that the subordination of punitive damage claims may be
required in Chapter 11 cases to some extent because § 1129(a) (7) provides that a plan
may not be confirmed without paying each nonconsenting creditor at least as much as
the creditor would receive in a Chapter 7 case. Id. § 1129(a) (7); see also NBC CODE
REVIEW PROJECT REPORT, supra note 8, at 42-43 ("While it has been argued that section
1129(a) (7)'s best interest rule requires a similar result in Chapter 11, or that section
510 permits a similar result, statutory clarification is needed to assure consistent treat-
ment." (footnotes omitted)).
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Any concern that the subordination of punitive damage claims
would allow companies or managers to escape the kind of punishment
for which punitive damage awards are designed should be given little
weight. First, punitive damage claims would be subordinated, rather
than disallowed, under this proposal and would rank ahead of pre-
bankruptcy equity interests, including those held by management.
Second, it is unlikely in mass tort cases that executives whose conduct
justifies the award of punitive damages will continue to manage the
reorganized debtoris
The subordination of punitive damage claims has occurred al-
ready in mass tort Chapter 11 cases, despite the lack of specific statu-
tory authority. For example, punitive damage claims were subordi-
nated in the A.H. Robins case. 57 Nonetheless, the Code should be
amended to expressly provide for such subordination.Is
F. Protect Asset Purchasers from SuccessorLiability
Companies in Chapter 11 commonly sell assets while the case is
pending.' 9 In many situations, the sale of one or more business divi-
sions as going concerns-either before a plan is confirmed or as part
of a plan-is the most effective way to maximize value for creditors.
The purchase price for such assets could be used to fund a trust for
mass tort claimants.
6 See NBC CODE REVIEW PRoJECT REPORT, supra note 8, at 42 ("Typically, former
management of the debtor whose conductjustified the assessment of punitive damages
has been replaced by new managers forced on the business by its creditors or such
managers will be excluded by statute from managing the reorganized entity." (foot-
notes omitted)); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 730-
31 (1993) (listing the turnover of CEOs in several Chapter 11 cases).
,57 In reA.H. Robins Co., 89 B.R. 555, 563 (E.D. Va. 1988) (finding that given the
nature of the case, allowing punitive damages would be inappropriate).
'-" This recommendation is consistent with the proposals of the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference. See NBC CODE REVIEV PROjECr REPORT, supra note 8, at 42 ("A
new section 510(d) should be added to provide that if claims for punitive damages are
allowed, they shall be subordinated to general unsecured claims.").
'0 See, e.g., United States v. LTV Corp. (In reChateaugay Corp.), 973 F.2d 141, 145
(2d Cir. 1992) (upholding bankruptcy court order approving the sale of substantially
all of the assets of a debtor subsidiary corporation during its Chapter 11 case); Com-
mittee of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1070-
71 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a debtor in Chapter 11 may sell substantially all its as-
sets if there is an articulated businessjustification for the sale before confirmation of a
reorganization plan); see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1994) (permitting a trustee, after no-
tice and a hearing, to sell property of the estate outside the ordinary course of busi-
ness).
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To maximize the purchase price for assets, especially functioning
business units, it is necessary to assure purchasers that they will not
have any liability with respect to any claims against the selling debtor.
This would not be a problem under traditional tort law which recog-
nizes that the purchaser of assets is not liable for the torts committed
by a seller.1 Several nonbankruptcy courts, however, have developed
a "successor doctrine" that allows an injured party with a product li-
ability claim against a manufacturer to recover damages from property• . 161
subsequently sold to a third party under certain circumstances. If
the successor doctrine could be applied when a Chapter 11 debtor
sells assets to a third party, so that future claimants could recover from
the asset purchaser despite the debtor's discharge, the price that a
162purchaser would be willing to pay would be discounted substantially.
Courts are not in agreement on whether a bankruptcy court could
cut off successor liability of a purchaser of assets. Section 363(f) of
the Bankruptcy Code provides that, in certain situations, the court
may approve a sale of assets "free and clear of any interest in such
propertyls63 It is not clear, however, that an injured person with a
product liability claim has an "interest" in the assets that could be cut
"0 See, e.g., Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that it
is a "well settled rule of corporate law" that when a company sells assets to another, the
purchaser does not become liable for the debts or liabilities, including tort liabilities,
of the seller).
'6 See, e.g., Mooney Aircraft Corp. v. Foster (In re Mooney Aircraft, Inc.), 730 F.2d
367, 371-72 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing the development of the successor doctrine);
Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 815-17 (NJ. 1981) (considering different
approaches to successor liability taken by various courts); see also Toll, supra note 142,
at 377 (noting that the successor liability doctrine is the exception to the general rule
that a corporation buying assets is not liable for the debts and other liabilities of the
seller). The successor doctrine is applicable when:
(i) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts and li-
abilities; (ii) the transaction is deemed a consolidation or merger of the
[buyer and the seller]; (iii) the buyer is merely a continuation of the [seller];
or (iv) the [sale] is entered into fraudulently to escape liability for the seller's
debts and other liabilities.
Id. (footnote omitted).
162 See, e.g., Paris Indus. Corp. v. Ace Hardware Corp. (In reParis Indus. Corp.), 132
B.R. 504, 510 n.14 (D. Me. 1991) ("Every sale must then be discounted by the risk the
purchaser sees of future claims."); Rubinstein v. Alaska Pac. Consortium (In re New
England Fish Co.), 19 B.R. 323, 328-29 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982) (commenting that
the successor doctrine could have a negative chilling effect on asset sales);J. Maxwell
Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles, Reorganization Law, and the Just Demand
That Relief Be Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANK DEv. J. 1, 7 (1995)
(explaining that if asset purchasers could be liable for the debtor's mass tort liability,
"prices obtained for the assets in bankruptcy will likely fall to their 'scrap' value").
162 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (1994).
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off under § 363(f), and as a result courts have disagreed on this is-
sue. Several courts have enjoined product liability suits against asset
purchasers recognizing that, if the successor doctrine could be used,
personal injury claimants would have an advantage over banks and
trade creditors who would not be the beneficiaries of the successor
doctrine. The effect would be the discounting of the purchase price
to account for the buyer's risks of successor liability-resulting in a
smaller distribution to unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy case-
together with preferential treatment for product liability claimants.
"The result is that successor liability theory would rearrange the prior-
ity scheme established by the Bankruptcy Code.
"16s
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission made a.sound rec-
ommendation when it proposed that the Bankruptcy Code be
amended to expressly authorize bankruptcy courts to enjoin all credi-
tors, including future mass tort claimants, from suing third party pur-
'" See, e.g., Paris Indus. Corp., 132 B.R. at 510 (upholding the bankruptcy court's
permanent injunction prohibiting third parties from bringing product liability actions
against a purchaser of a Chapter 11 debtor's manufacturing assets who bought the as-
sets subject to a court order that expressly provided that the sale was free and clear of
product liability claims). The court in Paris Industries noted that "[tio conclude that a
bankruptcy court cannot approve the sale of assets free and clear of such future claims
against a purchaser from the debtor significantly impairs the bankruptcy court's ability
to administer bankruptcy estates." Id. at 510 n.14; see also Volvo White Truck Corp. v.
Chambersburg Beverage, Inc. (In re White Motor Credit Corp.), 75 B.R. 944, 948
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) ("General unsecured claimants including tort claimants,
have no specific interest in a debtor's property. Therefore, section 363 is inapplicable
for sales free and clear of such claims."). Furthermore, the court found that a court
has the power to authorize a sale free of such claims under general equitable powers
"consistent with its power to discharge claims under a plan of reorganization." Id. But
see Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 161, 164 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming
the bankruptcy court's holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin fu-
ture product liability suits against a purchaser of assets based on the successor liability
doctrine with regard to personal injuries occurring after a "free and clear of claims"
sale under a confirmed liquidating Chapter 11 plan); Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 730 F.2d at
373 (noting that a sale free and clear of claims does not preclude use of the successor
doctrine when the product liability cause of action arises after the sale). See generally
Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195 B.R. 716, 729-32 (N.D. Ind.
1996) (noting that a few courts have held that § 363(0 applies only to in rem interests,
while other courts have applied it more broadly to unsecured employment discrimina-
tion and product liability claims).
165 American Living Sys. v. Bonapfel (In reAll Am., Inc.), 56 B.R. 186, 190 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1986); see also Paris Indus. Corp., 132 B.R. at 510 n.14 ("The result will be de-
creasing assets for those who already have claims and essentially a preference for later-
filed claims that can be brought against the purchaser."); William T.Bodoh & Michelle
M. Morgan, Inequality Among Creditors: The Unconstitutional Use of Successor Liability To
Create a New Class of Priority Claimants, 4 AM. BANR. INST. L. REv. 325, 330 (1996)
("[T]he application of successor liability to bankruptcy sales thwart[s] the policy goals
underlying the Bankruptcy Code, [and has] severe constitutional implications.. ").
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chasers of assets from a debtor-whether the sale occurs apart from or
under a Chapter 11 plan-but only if those claims have been repre-
sented in the bankruptcy case and the debtor or trustee has made
provisions for their treatment.'66 "Without the appointment of a mass
future claims representative, for example, the successor would not be
protected from liability for mass future claims."' 67 The "free and
clear" order would include a finding by the court that the requisite
standards for treating mass future claims have been satisfied.
By enabling debtors to sell assets free and clear under the circumstances
set forth in this Proposal, the Code would give parties the flexibility to
choose the form that will maximize the value of the assets of the debtor
without empowering parties to act strategically to disadvantage one class
of claimants. Freeing the productive assets of the business from the un-
certainty of mass future claimants will encourage buyers to offer a better
price. In so doing, more assets would be available to fund a greater re-
turn for present claimants and holders of mass future claims. At the
same time, this approach promotes the equitable treatment of similar
creditors by ensuring that holders of mass future claims do not receive
preferential treatment over the debtor's other creditors by following as-
sets on a successor liability theory, nor would they receive worse treat-
ment by being omitted from participation in the benefits from the sale
even if they live in ajurisdiction that does not recognize successor liabil-
ity 168ity.
m
Statutory clarification of the bankruptcy court's power to enjoin
successor liability suits against asset purchasers consistent with the
Commission's recommendation would be a significant improvement
that would make the bankruptcy system a better vehicle for the final
resolution of mass tort liability.'6
G. Provide for Preconfirmation Payments of Claimants'
Emergency Medical Expenses
In general, prebankruptcy claims may not be paid in a Chapter 11
case before a plan of reorganization has been confirmed."' The delay
'66 The Commission proposed to amend §§ 363 and 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code
to provide for asset sales free and clear of mass future claims.
... NBRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 349.
'6 Id. at 349-50 (footnote omitted).
169 See NBC CODE REVIEW PROJECr REPORT, supra note 8, at 41 (recommending
that the Bankruptcy Code be amended to provide that a good faith purchaser takes
free and clear of successor liability for pre-sale acts); Toll, supra note 142, at 378 ("The
Commission's proposal is a needed improvement to resolve an unfairness noted by
commentators.").
170 See Rosenberg Real Estate Equity Fund III v. Air Beds, Inc. (In re Air Beds, Inc.),
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in confirming a plan may be especially harmful to tort victims who are
in immediate need of medical attention without the benefit of ade-
quate insurance protection. The Bankruptcy Code should be
amended to permit the bankruptcy court, in limited situations, to
authorize distributions to the holders of personal injury claims to the
extent needed to satisfy particular emergency medical needs. The
court should have to determine that there is a high probability that
the claimant would eventually receive distributions in an amount not
less than the amount of the emergency distribution.
Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code17 has been used as the ba-
sis for bankruptcy courts to allow the payment of certain prebank-
ruptcy claims prematurely. Under this "doctrine of necessity," courts
have permitted the payment of prebankruptcy claims where the non-
payment of such claims would have a detrimental effect on the reor-
ganization effort.ln For example, courts have permitted debtors to
pay pre-petition, priority wage claims so that the debtor's work force
will continue postpetition without disruption resulting from poor mo-
rale.lu The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to extend expressly
the doctrine of necessity to permit preconfirmation payments to help
meet a personal injury claimant's uninsured immediate medical
needs.
Any emergency payment for medical assistance would be applied
to reduce subsequent distributions following plan confirmation. In
that way, emergency payments to tort claimants sufficient to address
immediate medical needs would result in an acceleration of payments,
not an increase in total distributions to the particular claimant.
An illustration of the need for a mechanism that permits precon-
firmation payments of emergency medical expenses is provided by the
92 B.R 419, 422 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) ("The general rule is that a distribution on a
pre-petition debt in a Chapter 11 case should not take place except pursuant to a con-
firmed plan of reorganization, absent extraordinary circumstances.").
171 Section 105(a) provides: "The court may issue any order... that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
172 See, &g., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp. (In re Sharon
Steel Corp.), 159 B.R. 730, 732 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (allowing sale to go forward
because proceeds were necessary to pay pre-petition wage claims in exchange for an
end to picketing and a work stoppage at debtor's plant); In re Quality Interiors, Inc.,
127 B.L 391, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) (recognizing that bankruptcy courts often
permit the payment of pre-petition wages so that the debtor in possession can maintain
an effective work force).
'7 See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 175 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(accepting this rationale as a sound business reason to justify such pre-petition pay-
ments).
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A.H. Robins case.'74 Dalkon Shield personal injury claimants proposed
a plan that would allow preconfirmation payments necessary to pay for
tubal reconstructive surgery or in-vitro fertilization procedures for
women under the age of forty who claimed infertility. The surgical
procedures had a thirty to sixty percent success rate. A $15 million
fund was proposed, which would pay for the $10,000 to $15,000 cost
of each surgical procedure. 75 Despite the support of the debtor and
all committees other than the shareholders, and approval of the dis-
trict court, the court of appeals held that such payments could not be
made because there is no authority under the Bankruptcy Code to
support paying medical expenses before a plan is confirmed. 7
CONCLUSION
The bankruptcy system provides an appropriate framework for re-
solving enterprise-threatening mass tort liability. The automatic stay
and nationwide bankruptcy jurisdiction are procedural attributes that
facilitate bringing all mass tort litigation against the debtor into one
court. The flexible classification scheme and the ability to impair
some or all classes of claims and equity interests provide a unique
mechanism for spreading the loss caused by mass tort liability among
some or all creditor and shareholder groups. The Chapter 11 confir-
mation requirements-including the absolute priority rule and pro-
tection against unfair discrimination in cram down cases, the "best in-
terest of creditors" test, voting provisions, and feasibility requirements
-are attributes that assure a minimum level of economic protection
and bargaining power for mass tort claimants and other creditors.
Despite the attributes of the bankruptcy system discussed in this
'74 A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986).
15 See Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 300-01 (4th
Cir. 1987) (setting forth the nature of the proposal and the cost estimates).
176 See id. at 300 (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) did not give the district court
authority to permit the payment of preconfirmation distributions for emergency medi-
cal expenses). The court of appeals also noted that such premature payments would
be preferential with respect to other personal injury claimants and other unsecured
claimants, even though such payments would be offset against subsequent distributions
after confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. See id For further discussion of this decision,
see Jason A. Rosenthal, Courts of Inequity: The Bankruptcy Laws'Failure to Adequately Pro-
tect the Dalkon Shield Victims, 45 FLA. L. REv. 223, 226-32 (1993) (recognizing that
"bankruptcy proceedings may be the only equitable method to compensate all of a
company's tort victims," but discussing the bankruptcy courts' reluctance to authorize
an Emergency Treatment Fund for Shield victims); Willging, supra note 114, at 84-85
(discussing how some of the infertility caused by the Dalkon Shield could have been
prevented if the court of appeals had not reversed the order implementing the plan).
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Article, however, there is a need for statutory improvements in certain
key areas. Most important is the clarification of the meaning of
"claim" in a mass tort context to avoid any uncertainties with respect
to the ability to treat and discharge "future claims" that are reasonably
capable of estimation. Other areas that warrant statutory improve-
ment or clarification include the appointment and role of a legal rep-
resentative to act on behalf of future claimants, estimation of future
claims for distribution purposes, channeling injunctions, subordina-
tion of punitive damage claims, protecting asset purchasers from suc-
cessor liability, and the authorization of emergency medical payments
to tort victims before plan confirmation.
* * * * * *
